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8.1 Introduction
In the last few years, there has been a revival of the notion that capital
controls may be a necessary evil. The main argument is that, although cap-
ital controls may introduce some economic distortions, excess capital mo-
bility is partially responsible for ﬁnancial crises (and macroeconomic in-
stability) in emerging market economies (Stiglitz 2002). Capital controls,
goes the argument, provide emerging market economies the means to pre-
vent these unpleasant consequences. However, recent papers (e.g., Ed-
wards 2005) have found no systematic evidence suggesting that countries
with higher capital mobility tend to have a higher incidence of crises.
Detailed case studies may provide evidence for this debate. The Brazil-
ian case provides an interesting example. Although Brazil still adopts a
complex web of bureaucratic controls on capital ﬂows, in the last ﬁfteen
years it has been more ﬁnancially open than other large emerging market
economies, in particular China and India. The analysis of Brazil, a large
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and do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Central Bank of Brazil.sub-investment-grade emerging market economy, which is relatively inte-
grated to the ﬁnancial world and has suﬀered from both ﬁnancial crises
and macroeconomic volatility, could shed further light on the capital con-
trols issue. This chapter details the experience of Brazil with capital mobil-
ity and controls.
Macroeconomic performance in Brazil has indeed been quite volatile
over the last thirty years. Part of this volatility can be traced to a sequence
of ﬁnancial crises and sudden stops and a boom-and-bust pattern of cur-
rent account deﬁcits and capital ﬂows. Brazil experienced two large cycles
of current account deﬁcits: one in the 1970s, which lasted until the debt cri-
sis of the early 1980s, and the second in the 1990s, which ended with an
abrupt reversal of the current account deﬁcit after the 2002 electoral crisis.
In 2004 Brazil ran a current account surplus of almost 2 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP), receiving approximately 2 percent of GDP in net
foreign direct investment (FDI); and since the beginning of the 2000s, for
the ﬁrst time in decades, Brazil has been reducing its external debt. In this
environment, one wonders whether this performance is the sign of a new
trend or the beginning of yet another cycle that eventually will reverse
course. The issue is whether a regime based on a ﬂoating exchange rate, in-
ﬂation targeting, ﬁscal responsibility, and a relatively more open ﬁnancial
account induced a structural change. It is diﬃcult to judge at this point.
However, the combination of a few factors suggests a new trend. First, the
ﬂoating exchange rate regime is providing more incentives for borrowers to
better assess risk, in particular in the nontradable sector. Second, exports
are increasing in a magnitude not seen before, leading to a record low ra-
tio (although still high by international comparison) of external debt to ex-
ports. Third, the larger role of net direct investment in the latest surge in
capital ﬂows is encouraging from a debt accumulation perspective. Never-
theless, more analysis is needed. From a historical perspective, a relevant
question is how the current phase compares to the previous adjustment un-
dertaken after the debt crisis of the 1980s. It is important to look at the past
experience in Brazil.
In the last ﬁfteen years Brazil has also started liberalizing its capital ac-
count. The liberalization was a gradual process of establishing new rules on
capital inﬂows and outﬂows. The result of the liberalization process was (a)
reduction or elimination of taxes on foreign capital ﬁnancial transactions
and of minimum maturity requirements on loans; (b) elimination of quan-
titative restrictions on investments by nonresidents in ﬁnancial and capital
markets securities issued either domestically or abroad; (c) permission for
residents to issue securities abroad, including debt, without prior approval
by the Central Bank; (d) more freedom for residents to invest in FDI and
portfolio abroad; and ﬁnally (e) the introduction of currency convertibil-
ity, initially through the mechanism of “international transfers in reais,”
whereby residents could transfer their resources abroad through the use of
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in place.
In spite of the liberalization, the resulting system does not mean un-
restricted freedom or free convertibility.1Export proceeds still are required
to be converted into domestic currency (“export surrender”), and there are
limits on foreign currency deposits. Current currency convertibility is
based on the monetary authority’s rules instead of laws. Therefore, these
rules can be lifted at any time. In addition, public opinion still associates
transfers abroad with illicit or antipatriotic practices. Also, notwithstand-
ing the eﬀorts to consolidate the exchange and capital account rules, regu-
lation is still fragmented and involves rules set in diﬀerent contexts and
driven by various motivations.
A consolidation of the whole regulation in a uniﬁed law approved by
Congress is necessary. Reduction in bureaucratic requirements is needed as
well. The rules would become clearer and less uncertain. These changes
would facilitate a change in the mentality that originated back in the capi-
tal ﬂight period, when transfers abroad were necessarily associated with il-
licit or antipatriotic practices.
The great volatility of capital ﬂows has been one of the main arguments
of those that oppose complete liberalization of capital movements. Since
liberalization in Brazil has occurred in parallel to a period of higher macro-
economic volatility, one could wonder whether the case of Brazil reinforces
the argument. The key points of the chapter, summarized in the following
list, do not point in this direction:
1. The debt accumulation pattern changed substantially after the liber-
alization of the capital account and, especially, after the ﬂoating of the cur-
rency. The private sector decreased signiﬁcantly its issuance of external
debt. The reduction in private debt resulted partly from the abrupt inter-
ruption of access during the crises but also from the ﬂoating of the cur-
rency, which ended a period of implicit guarantees that included a ﬁxed
parity for borrowers.
2. The proﬁle of external ﬁnancing has also changed since liberalization
and the ﬂoating regime. After a period based on portfolio investment, FDI
replaced it as the main ﬁnancing source. Since 1998, net direct investment
has comprised more than 100 percent of net private capital ﬂows. In gen-
eral, FDI ﬂows tend to be more stable and less correlated with other ﬂows.
Long-term debt ﬂows worked as a stabilizing factor during external crises,
but behaved procyclically during domestic crises.
3. Net ﬁnancial ﬂows have, in general, ﬁnanced current account deﬁcits.
Some diﬀerences emerge over time. Net ﬁnancial ﬂows ﬁnanced (a) a
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1. The complete set of existing capital controls is presented in appendix A.strong accumulation of international reserves between 1992 and 1996; (b)
a large expansion of the current account deﬁcit from 1995 to 1997, repre-
senting a growth of both investment and consumption; and (c) an increase
in the current account deﬁcit from 1998 to 2001, resulting from a higher
deﬁcit in net income from abroad.
4. Following capital account liberalization, consumption—its growth
rate and share in GDP—has been more stable than in the 1980s. In com-
parison to the 1990s growth episodes, economic growth in 2000–2001 and
at the time of this writing (2004) took place in a diﬀerent context. First, net
capital ﬂows have been of a lower magnitude and have been dominated by
FDI. There has been no signiﬁcant surge of short-term ﬂows or portfolio
investment. Second, the expansions have been accompanied by a more fa-
vorable situation in the trade balance. Third, one could argue that funda-
mentals improved with the change in the ﬁscal policy regime and the adop-
tion of inﬂation targeting.
5. Sudden stops are more pronounced when the crisis is mostly domes-
tically driven. Analysis using a vector autoregressive (VAR) estimation indi-
cates that shocks to the country risk premium (measured by the Emerging
Markets Bond Index [EMBI]) have the clearest eﬀect on macroeconomic
performance. Higher country risk levels induce greater interest rates, a
more depreciated exchange rate, a reduction in capital inﬂows, and lower
output. This leads us to the importance of building up good fundamentals
in the economy.
These key points lead us to conclude that, notwithstanding the ﬁnancial
crises and macroeconomic volatility of the recent past, capital account lib-
eralization has led to a more resilient economy. Therefore, further capital
account liberalization should be considered. Liberalization should be ac-
companied by a broad range of reforms to improve and foster stronger in-
stitutions—such as approval of de jure (not only de facto) central bank in-
dependence—establish a longer track record of responsible ﬁscal policy
(under the ﬁscal responsibility law), and reduce microeconomic ineﬃcien-
cies and contractual uncertainties.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides the bal-
ance-of-payment stylized facts of the last three decades (current account
cycles, capital ﬂow cycles and composition, and debt accumulation). Sec-
tion 8.3 describes the evolution of capital controls in Brazil and evaluates
the beneﬁts and costs of further capital account liberalization. Section 8.4
examines the volatility of capital ﬂows in general and the behavior of the
ﬂows during ﬁnancial crises. Section 8.5 analyzes the relationship between
capital ﬂows and macroeconomic performance in Brazil, evaluating what
capital ﬂows have ﬁnanced, the recent growth pattern, and whether there
is more consumption smoothing. In addition, we conduct some estima-
tions on the determinants of capital ﬂows and develop a structural VAR to
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formance. The ﬁnal section presents the main conclusions.
8.2 Stylized Facts
Macroeconomic performance in Brazil has been volatile. Part of this
volatility can be traced to the boom-and-bust pattern in the balance of pay-
ments. In fact, there have been long and pronounced cycles of current ac-
count deﬁcits that ended abruptly. Each cycle had its own history: diﬀerent
types of capital ﬂows ﬁnanced the boom, sudden stops had diﬀerent char-
acteristics, and policy behavior was distinct.
After the conﬁdence crisis in 2002, Brazil entered a postadjustment pe-
riod, running both trade and current account surpluses. How does this
phase compare to the previous adjustment after the debt crisis?
This section provides the stylized facts of the main components of the
balance of payments in the last decades, starting with the current account
cycles but then focusing on capital ﬂows and the accumulation of external
debt.
8.2.1 Current Account Cycles
In the last decades, Brazil experienced two large cycles of current ac-
count deﬁcits, one in the 1970s, which lasted until the debt crisis of the
early 1980s, and the second in the 1990s, punctuated by the crises of the last
few years. Figure 8.1shows the behavior of the current account and private
capital account, deﬁned as the capital and ﬁnancial accounts minus oﬃcial
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Fig. 8.1 Current account and private capital account (four-quarter cumulative bal-
ance, 1970:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)agency–related loans.2 These long periods of current account deﬁcits were
ﬁnanced by voluntary capital ﬂows. The ﬁrst period was also a period of
high average GDP growth, but this was not the case in the second period.
Tables 8.1 and 8.2 show annual values and period averages for broad cate-
gories of the balance of payments as a percentage of GDP as well as for
GDP growth rate.
The behavior of the current account has been, in general, dominated by
the dynamics of the trade balance, whose deﬁcit cycles are ﬁnanced by
large expansions of capital inﬂows. Figure 8.2 depicts the path of the trade
balance and income balance (net remittances abroad of wages, proﬁts, div-
idends, and interests), which are the main components of the current ac-
count.3
To analyze the current account performance in a broader macroeco-
nomic context, internationally as well as domestically, including the eﬀect
of policy decisions, we subdivide the current account performance into ﬁve
phases since the mid-1970s, described in the following list.
1. 1974–82: The second National Development Plan (PND II) and exter-
nal debt accumulation. The economy presented large trade deﬁcits
from 1974 through 1980—averaging 1.6 percent of GDP—as a result
of the heavy investments under the PND II and the two oil price
shocks (1973 and 1979). The current account deﬁcit was also exacer-
bated by the increase in U.S. interest rates in 1979. The deﬁcits were ﬁ-
nanced basically by syndicated loans, in the context of a large expan-
sion of international ﬁnancial market liquidity. The external ﬁnancing
and investments under the PND II supported maintenance of high
economic growth—GDP growth averaged 7.0 percent in the 1974–80
period—despite the oil crisis. The inﬂation rate was also increasing,
rising from 15.5 percent in 1973 to 110.2 percent in 1980 (measured by
the General Price Index [IGP-DI]). However, external debt reached
high, unsustainable levels, leading to the 1982 external debt crisis.
2. 1983–94: External debt renegotiation, current account adjustment, and
high inﬂation. With the interruption of voluntary capital ﬂows, the
economy had to generate trade surpluses to ﬁnance the income ac-
count deﬁcits. In fact, after the 1981–83 adjustment—maxi-
devaluation of the domestic currency and tightness of macroeco-
nomic policy—the economy generated large trade surpluses from
1983 through 1994 (averaging 4.0 percent of GDP). In 1984, the trade
surplus peaked at 6.9 percent of GDP. The current account balance
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2. See appendix C for a more detailed explanation of the capital ﬂows variables used in the
text. The ﬁgures in the text are either shown as percentage of GDP or based on constant 2003
U.S. dollars.
3. Current account balance  trade balance  balance of services  income balance  cur-
rent transfers balance.stood at around zero, except for the deﬁcits at the end of 1986 and be-
ginning of 1987, as a result of the Cruzado Plan. GDP growth fell sig-
niﬁcantly, averaging 2.0 percent from 1983 through 1992, reaching
negative values in four of these years. It was also a period of high in-
ﬂation, which peaked at 82.4 percent per month in March 1990 and
47.4 percent in June 1994 (measured by the Broad National Con-
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Table 8.1 Balance of payments (% of GDP) and GDP growth
International GDP  Per  capita 
Capital and  Private  reserves:  growth  GDP growth
Current Trade  ﬁnancial  capital  Liquidity  rate  rate 
account balance account account concept (%) (%)
1970 –1.97 0.54 3.01 1.75 2.79 10.40 7.20
1971 –3.31 –0.70 4.42 3.14 3.50 11.34 8.42
1972 –2.87 –0.41 6.46 5.53 7.12 11.94 9.05
1973 –2.48 0.01 4.89 3.91 7.63 13.97 11.07
1974 –6.80 –4.25 5.92 4.82 4.77 8.15 5.45
1975 –5.39 –2.73 4.91 4.14 3.11 5.17 2.58
1976 –4.17 –1.46 5.52 4.93 4.25 10.26 7.60
1977 –2.72 0.05 3.47 2.78 4.09 4.93 2.45
1978 –3.47 –0.51 5.91 5.17 5.91 4.97 2.54
1979 –4.79 –1.27 3.41 2.87 4.34 6.76 4.34
1980 –5.36 –1.19 4.04 3.56 2.91 9.20 6.80
1981 –4.53 0.47 4.93 4.36 2.90 –4.25 –6.34
1982 –6.00 0.29 4.46 1.95 1.47 0.83 –1.34
1983 –3.57 3.42 3.92 3.29 2.41 –2.93 –4.99
1984 0.05 6.90 3.44 0.96 6.32 5.40 3.20
1985 –0.12 5.91 0.09 –0.91 5.50 7.85 5.64
1986 –2.06 3.22 0.56 0.35 2.62 7.49 5.35
1987 –0.51 3.96 1.15 1.35 2.64 3.53 1.56
1988 1.37 6.28 –0.69 –1.09 2.99 –0.06 –1.88
1989 0.25 3.88 0.15 0.42 2.33 3.16 1.36
1990 –0.81 2.29 0.98 1.72 2.13 –4.35 –5.95
1991 –0.35 2.61 0.04 0.78 2.32 1.03 –0.66
1992 1.58 3.93 2.57 0.60 6.13 –0.54 –2.15
1993 –0.16 3.10 2.44 2.85 7.50 4.92 3.26
1994 –0.33 1.93 1.60 1.86 7.15 5.85 4.20
1995 –2.61 –0.49 4.12 4.33 7.35 4.22 2.62
1996 –3.03 –0.72 4.38 4.46 7.75 2.66 1.10
1997 –3.77 –0.84 3.19 3.07 6.46 3.27 1.72
1998 –4.24 –0.83 3.77 2.37 5.66 0.13 –1.36
1999 –4.72 –0.22 3.23 2.26 6.77 0.79 –0.71
2000 –4.02 –0.12 3.21 4.40 5.48 4.36 2.82
2001 –4.55 0.52 5.31 3.75 7.04 1.31 –0.17
2002 –1.66 2.86 1.74 –0.92 8.23 1.93 0.45
2003 0.82 4.89 1.01 0.50 9.73 0.54 –0.92
2004 1.94 5.60 –1.22 0.07 8.80 4.94 3.44
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil, IBGE, and authors’ calculations.sumer Price Index [IPCA]). Several stabilization programs tried to
curb inﬂation, but achieved only temporary success. The end of the
high-inﬂation period came with the Real Plan, launched in July 1994.
The process of external debt renegotiation underwent several phases,
eventually concluding with the conversion of the loans into debt se-
curities under the Brady Plan in April 1994.4From 1992 through mid-
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Table 8.2 Balance of payments (% of GDP) and GDP growth: Period averages
International GDP  Per  capita 
Capital and  Private  reserves:  growth  GDP growth
Current Trade  ﬁnancial  capital  Liquidity  rate  rate 
account balance account account concept (%) (%)
1974–1982 –4.80 –1.18 4.73 3.84 3.75 5.03 2.59
1983–1994 –0.39 3.95 1.35 1.01 4.17 2.54 0.68
1995–1998 –3.41 –0.72 3.87 3.56 6.80 2.56 1.01
1999–2001 –4.43 0.06 3.91 3.47 6.43 2.14 0.63
2002–2004 0.37 4.45 0.51 –0.11 8.92 2.45 0.97
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil, IBGE, and authors’ calculations.
Fig. 8.2 Trade balance and income balance (four-quarter cumulative balance,
1970:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)
4. In 1991, the Brazilian government and the creditor private bank committee renegotiated
the delayed interest payments of 1989 and 1990, and in the following year they agreed on a
term sheet that set some principles for the negotiation. At end 1993, a ﬁnal agreement was
reached, under the guidelines of the Brady Plan, by which the loans were converted into sov-
ereign bonds, some of them having U.S. Treasury bonds as collateral. The conversion oc-
curred in April 1994. For an institutional description of the process of renegotiation, see
Cerqueira (2003).1994, exchange rate policy, under a managed system, basically aimed
to keep constant the purchasing power of the domestic currency, as
we can see in ﬁgure 8.3, which shows the real eﬀective exchange rate
and the trade balance.
3. 1995–98: New cycle of trade deﬁcits, low inﬂation, and ﬁnancial crises.
The revival of capital ﬂows to emerging market economies at the be-
ginning of the 1990s, the regulation changes in the capital account,
and the external debt restructuring ended the external ﬁnancing re-
strictions of the 1980s. Moreover, for the ﬁrst time in more than three
decades, the economy enjoyed a low-inﬂation environment. In 1995,
inﬂation fell to 22.4 percent, and in 1998 it reached 1.7 percent. The
stability brought by the Real Plan was also accompanied by a rela-
tively short economic growth cycle, as depicted in ﬁgure 8.4. In the
initial months after the launch of the Real Plan, a ﬂoating system was
adopted, followed the next year by a crawling band, which increas-
ingly turned into a crawling peg. Figure 8.5 shows the steady and low
rate of adjustment in the nominal exchange rate, which led to a sub-
stantial appreciation of the real eﬀective rate (ﬁgure 8.3). As a conse-
quence of the surge in capital inﬂows, exchange rate overvaluation,
and higher economic growth, large trade deﬁcits emerged from 1995
through 1998 (averaging 0.7 percent of GDP, which is a value largely
underestimated by the increase in dollar-denominated GDP resulting
from the exchange rate overvaluation). The capital inﬂows that ﬁ-
nanced the deﬁcits were predominantly portfolio investment (equity
and debt securities) until 1996–97, when FDI started to assume
greater signiﬁcance. The economy was hit by external ﬁnancial crises
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Fig. 8.3 Real eﬀective exchange rate and cumulative twelve-month trade balance
(January 1991–September 2004)(Mexican, Asian, and Russian) and faced the domestic exchange cri-
sis in 1998, which ended with the collapse of the exchange regime in
January 1999.
4. 1999–2001: Floating exchange system, inﬂation targeting, sound ﬁscal
policy, and reversal of trade balance deﬁcits. Economic policy had to
deal with the exchange rate crisis and undertake a substantial change
in the ﬁscal regime. A ﬂoating exchange rate system and an inﬂation-
targeting regime were adopted, and substantial primary surpluses
generated. Public-sector primary surplus rose from 0.0 percent of
GDP in 1998 to 3.2 percent in the following year, reaching 4.4 percent
in 2003. The exchange rate depreciated from 1.22 Brazilian reais (R$)
to the U.S. dollar in mid-January 1999 to R$/US$ 2.16 at the begin-
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Fig. 8.4 GDP growth rate (1991–2004)
Fig. 8.5 Nominal exchange rate (January 1990–October 2004)ning of March. In June 1999, inﬂation targets were announced for
that year and the following two years. It was a period of transition in
terms of current account adjustment. The trade deﬁcit fell from 0.8
percent of GDP in 1998 to 0.2 percent in 1999, turning into a surplus
of 0.5 percent in 2001.
5. 2002 to the present: Conﬁdence crisis and large current account adjust-
ment. Throughout 2002, with the electoral uncertainties, the econ-
omy faced a conﬁdence crisis. Country risk premiums and the ex-
change rate rose sharply. After the transition of the prior years, large
trade surpluses solidiﬁed from 2002 onward. The surpluses are a con-
sequence of signiﬁcant exchange rate depreciation, strong world eco-
nomic growth, and a few speciﬁc bilateral trade agreements. In 2003
and 2004, the trade surplus reached 5.0 percent and 5.6 percent of
GDP (US$24.8 billion and US$33.7 billion), respectively, leading to
a current account surplus of 0.8 percent and 1.9 percent of GDP. The
positive results in the trade balance have been accompanied by both
export and import growth. In 2004, exports and imports reached
US$96.5 billion and US$62.8 billion, respectively, representing an in-
crease of 32.0 percent and 30.0 percent in relation to the previous
year. In fact, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.6, the degree of trade openness
of the economy—measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP—has reached the record level of 26.5 percent, in sharp contrast
to a 14.0 percent average in the 1990s.
Therefore, after the conﬁdence crisis, Brazil entered a postadjustment
period, running both trade and current account surpluses. How does this
phase compare to the previous adjustment after the debt crisis? In both
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Fig. 8.6 Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (1970–2004)
Note: GDP for 2004 is estimated.cases, there was a strong reversion of the trade deﬁcit cycle. The trade bal-
ance rose from –1.2 percent of GDP in 1980 to 6.9 percent in 1984, and
from –0.8 percent in 1998 to 5.6 percent in 2004. Similarly, the trade ad-
justment was stimulated by a substantial exchange rate devaluation, which
simultaneously generated signiﬁcant inﬂationary pressures. However, the
two adjustments present some important diﬀerences. First, the economic
slowdown in the 1980s adjustment was substantially higher than in the
2000s. GDP accumulated a contraction of 6.3 percent in the 1981–83 pe-
riod. In the recent adjustment, the higher troughs, considering four-
quarter cumulative GDP, were of –0.5 percent in 1999:Q3, 0.0 percent in
2002:Q2, and 0.5 percent in 2003:Q4. Second, the exchange rate movement
was higher in the recent adjustment. The real eﬀective exchange rate rose
by 35 percent in the months following the maxi-devaluation of February
1983 in comparison to the previous months. In 1999, the increase was
around 47 percent, and it accumulated 66 percent until 2001. Third, the
1980s adjustment aﬀected imports more intensely than exports. In 1984,
imports fell by 39.4 percent relative to 1980, while exports increased 34.1
percent. The reduction in imports accounted for 56.8 percent of the change
in the trade balance. In contrast, the recent adjustment has been incurred
mainly by exports. In relation to 1998, exports grew 42.9 percent and 88.6
percent in 2003 and 2004, respectively, and imports fell by 16.3 percent in
2003 and grew by 8.8 percent in the following year. As a consequence, al-
though also a reﬂection of changes in dollar-denominated GDP, the in-
crease in the degree of openness has been substantially higher recently. Ex-
ports plus imports as a percentage of GDP rose from 18.1 percent to 21.6
percent between 1980 and 1984, whereas it went from 13.8 percent in 1998
to 26.5 percent in 2004. Fourth, in the 1980s, the country was excluded
from international capital ﬂows, whereas, since the 1990s, it has been inte-
grated in the ﬁnancial markets. Fifth, the level of import tariﬀs is lower cur-
rently than in the 1980s. Sixth, macroeconomic regimes are completely
diﬀerent: low inﬂation, sound ﬁscal policy, and better monetary institu-
tions in the 2000s versus high inﬂation, unsound ﬁscal policy, and weak
monetary institutions in the 1980s.
Although the trade balance has played the main role in the current ac-
count boom-and-bust cycles, the income balance has undergone important
changes as well. Since 1998, the income deﬁcit has reached a higher level
(1998–2003 annual average of 3.4 percent of GDP), as a result of the surge
in capital inﬂows, which increased nonresident-owned assets in the econ-
omy. As a consequence of the external debt conversion under the Brady
Plan and the change in the pattern of capital inﬂows—from loans to direct
and portfolio investment—the composition of the income balance has
changed signiﬁcantly since the 1990s, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.7. The deﬁcit
in portfolio investment income, rather than the deﬁcit in other investment
income, has become the main component since 1997, accounting for 46.8
360 Ilan Goldfajn and André Minellapercent of the investment income deﬁcit from 2000 through 2003. The
share of the income deﬁcit attributable to direct investments rose to 22.6
percent, whereas the share of the deﬁcit attributable to other investment in-
come decreased to 30.6 percent.
8.2.2 Capital Flow Cycles and Their Composition
Although current account cycles have a corresponding capital ﬂow ﬁ-
nancing, it is not necessarily the case that capital ﬂows behave in the same
manner in each cycle. In fact, there are major diﬀerences in the composi-
tion of capital ﬂows across the current account cycles—private versus
public, portfolio, or FDI—that we opted to subdivide capital ﬂow behav-
ior into three longer periods (instead of the ﬁve above). We detail the
methodological decomposition of capital ﬂows into six categories in ap-
pendix C. Figures 8.8 and 8.9 show the path of the main categories.
1. 1970s–1982: Loan ﬂows and external debt accumulation. In the con-
text of a signiﬁcant liquidity expansion in international ﬁnancial
markets, Brazil received massive capital inﬂows. Table 8.3 shows, for
each period, the average of diﬀerent ﬂows (as a percent of GDP). The
private capital account balance averaged 3.8 percent of GDP from
1974 through 1982. As recorded in ﬁgure 8.9, the majority of capital
inﬂows were loans, comprising 74.3 percent of the private capital bal-
ance. In contrast, portfolio investment was minimal (a 5.4 percent
share in the ﬂows). As a result, gross external debt, as a percentage of
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Fig. 8.7 Income account deﬁcit (four-quarter cumulative balance, 1979:Q4–
2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)GDP, from 16.8 percent in 1970, reached 31.5 percent in 1982, and
peaked at 53.8 percent in 1984 (new ﬂows in the context of debt re-
negotiation, and maxi-devaluation of domestic currency reducing
dollar-denominated GDP).
2. 1983–91: Shortage of capital ﬂows. The external debt crisis and debt
renegotiation—extended until 1994—dominated the period. The
scarce capital ﬂows were basically part of debt renegotiation. The
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Fig. 8.8 Direct investments, portfolio investments, loans and trade credits, and
other short-term assets (four-quarter cumulative balance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at
2003 prices)
Fig. 8.9 Debt securities, loans, trade credits and equity securities: Ratio to GDP
(1970–2003)private account balance averaged 1.7 percent of GDP in the period
(declining to 1.0 percent when excluding 1983–84). In 1983 and 1984,
the country still received positive loan ﬂows, but under the debt rene-
gotiation. In fact, the loan ﬂow balance remained negative for one
decade (1985–94). Likewise, the negligible positive portfolio invest-
ment turned into (negligible) negative ﬂows. Net direct investment
was aﬀected as well. As a percentage of GDP, it fell from 0.6 percent
of GDP, in the previous period, to 0.2 percent.
3. 1992 to the present: Financial openness, reintegration in the interna-
tional ﬁnancial markets, and large swings of capital ﬂows.The country
was reintegrated into cross-border ﬂows. The resumption of capital
ﬂows to Brazil was associated with several factors: (a) increase in in-
ternational liquidity and expansion of pension and hedge funds; (b)
the process of capital account liberalization; (c) high-yield diﬀeren-
tials between domestic and foreign bonds; (d) the end of the external
debt restructuring period; and (e) higher macroeconomic stability
with the launch of the Real Plan. The three main characteristics of
capital ﬂows in this period were the following: (a) the important role
played by portfolio investment; (b) large swings in capital ﬂows (“sud-
den stop” crises); and (c) the increasing role of FDI.
The resumption of capital ﬂows was dominated by portfolio invest-
ment.5 Except for brief pauses during the Mexican and Asian crises, port-
folio inﬂows increased systematically and reached a four-quarter cumula-
tive average of US$20 billion between 1996 and mid-1998. Portfolio
investment accounted for 73.0 percent of the private capital account bal-
ance between 1992 and 1998, averaging 2.3 percent of GDP. In general,
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Table 8.3 Net capital ﬂows by groups: Ratio to GDP
Other 
Direct Equity Debt  Trade  short-term  Oﬃcial Other 
investment securities securities Loans credits assets agencies items
1974–1982 0.56 0.03 0.17 2.86 0.07 0.20 0.53 –0.04
1983–1991 0.20 0.02 –0.02 0.40 –0.36 0.12 0.11 0.40
1992–2004 2.27 0.56 0.77 –0.18 0.08 –0.91 0.42 –0.40
1992–1996 0.53 0.86 1.61 0.62 0.72 –0.61 0.16 –1.14
1997–2004 3.36 0.36 0.25 –0.68 –0.31 –1.10 0.59 0.07
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and authors’ calculations.
Note:The values of debt securities, portfolio investment, and loans exclude the values related to the debt
conversion under the Brady Plan.
5. The category portfolio investment follows the IMF’s deﬁnition. It is represented by cross-
border investment in equity securities that is not classiﬁed as direct investment, and debt se-
curities. This category includes securities negotiated in Brazil and abroad.debt security ﬂows were larger than equity ﬂows. The expansion of debt se-
curities was reinforced by the return of the government to the international
ﬁnancial markets after the debt restructuring, with the ﬁrst issuance of sov-
ereign bonds taking place in mid-1995.
Portfolio investment also played an important role in the large capital
ﬂow swings associated with the ﬁnancial crises, more intensely in the do-
mestic crises (the exchange crisis in 1998–99 and the conﬁdence crisis in
2002). The net portfolio balance amounted to –$11.2 billion from 1998:Q3
through 1999:Q1, and to –$7.6 billion in the last three quarters of 2002 (in
U.S. dollars).
The other component that played a key role during the sudden-stop
crises was “other short-term assets.” These ﬂows are, in general, negative
because they basically refer to transfers of domestic currency abroad. As
with portfolio investment, the main negative peaks of this group were as-
sociated with the ﬁnancial crises. The higher trough took place in the ex-
change crisis, when its negative balance summed to –$15.2 billion (in U.S.
dollars) in the last three quarters of 1998. These outﬂows were associated
with growing doubts about the sustainability of the exchange rate regime
and the corresponding expectations of currency devaluation. It was a way
of protecting asset values in foreign currency and having capital gains in
domestic currency. For those who had issued foreign currency–denomi-
nated or linked debt, it represented a way of hedging against prospective
devaluation. After the devaluation in January 1999, these outﬂows fell sig-
niﬁcantly and were increasingly lower, except during the conﬁdence crisis,
when they reached a balance of –$5.6 billion (in U.S. dollars) in the last
three quarters of 2002.
The main change in the proﬁle of capital ﬂows in the second half of the
1990s was the increasing role played by FDI. In fact, since 1998, net direct
investment has become the main inﬂow group. These inﬂows followed a
cycle of expansion, from the mid-1990s through 2002, peaking in 1999 and
2000. The expansion was stimulated by the improvement in domestic
macroeconomic conditions with the Real plan, the lifting of restrictions on
foreign investments in some sectors, and the wave of privatizations. The
change to a low-inﬂation environment has reduced the level of uncertainty
in the economy and ended the distortions brought about by high inﬂation.
Furthermore, the passage to a more solid macroeconomic regime in 1999
has built a better economic environment.
Privatization was not, however, the main component of net FDI (ﬁgure
8.10). From 1997 through 2000, privatization accounted for 25.0 percent of
net FDI. These data, however, tend to underestimate the contribution of
privatization because they do not include additional capital inﬂows in the
form of investment following privatization. In spite of the reduction in
FDI, the levels have been relatively high. Net FDI stood at US$10.1 billion
and US$18.2 billion in 2003 and 2004, representing 2.1 percent and 3.0
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ternal ﬁnancing has shifted from debt inﬂows to direct investment. More-
over, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.8, net direct investment was much less
aﬀected than the other components during the crises.
Flows related to oﬃcial agencies have demonstrated large increases
when there was a sharp reduction in private capital ﬂows, working clearly
as compensatory ﬂows. Figure 8.11 shows the balance of the private capi-
tal account and the oﬃcial agency–related loans. The role of these ﬂows is
evident during both domestic crises. Between 2002:Q2 and 2003:Q3, net
credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached US$22.7
billion (a gross credit of US$33.6 billion). The correlation coeﬃcient be-
tween the two groups is –0.17 (1992:Q2–2004:Q2).
Using the deﬁnition of short- and long-term ﬂows described in appendix
C, ﬁgure 8.12shows that short-term debt ﬂows were preponderant between
1993 and 1996, and were clearly aﬀected by the crises. Long-term debt
ﬂows, in turn, fell signiﬁcantly during the domestic crises. Therefore, it
seems that short-term ﬂows were more sensitive to contagion crises than
long-term ﬂows, but the latter did not work as a factor of stability during
domestic crises.
8.2.3 The Stocks: Has the Accumulation of External Debt Been Halted?
The revival of capital ﬂows to Brazil was accompanied by an increase in
external debt, mainly in the second half of the 1990s. Figure 8.13 shows
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Fig. 8.10 Net foreign direct investment and privatization as a proportion of GDP
(1990–2004)
6. The 2004 ﬁgures include large operations involving a single ﬁrm.gross and net external debt as a proportion of GDP.7This ratio, however, is
largely aﬀected by the eﬀect of exchange rate variations on GDP measured
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Fig. 8.11 Private capital account and oﬃcial-agency-related loans (four-quarter
cumulative balance, 1990:Q1–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)
Fig. 8.12 Short- and long-term debt net ﬂows (four-quarter cumulative balance,
1990:Q1–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)
7. Net external debt is obtained by subtracting reserves, commercial banks’ assets, and
Brazilian credits abroad from gross debt. Following IMF’s recommendations, intercompany
loans are excluded from external debt (starting in 1992 as data on these loans are not avail-
able previously).in dollars. Considering the debt level at constant prices, ﬁgure 8.14 shows
the path of both public and private external debt.
The debt accumulation in the second half of the 1990s was primarily un-
dertaken by the private sector. The lower interest rates on external debt rel-
ative to domestic debt, the stability of the exchange rate, and the associated
implicit guarantee of exchange rate system continuity worked as important
stimuli for the issuance of external debt, in the context of abundant inter-
national liquidity. Private external debt was rapidly increasing between
1992 and 1998, rising from US$21.9 billion to US$112.3 billion. As a con-
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Fig. 8.13 Gross and net external debt as a proportion of GDP (1971–2004)
Fig. 8.14 Public and private external debt (1989–2004, at 2003 prices)sequence, the share of private-sector debt in total external debt rose from
17.0 percent to 50.2 percent.
The debt accumulation pattern has changed substantially after the ﬂoat
and large depreciation of the currency. The private sector signiﬁcantly de-
creased its issuance of external debt, leading to a strong decline in private
external debt, from US$111.6 billion in 2000 to US$71.7 billion in Sep-
tember 2004. The abrupt reduction in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001 reﬂects an
important data revision that excluded debt that was already paid but was
not registered as such. This means that part of the debt decline of 2001 ac-
tually occurred in the previous years. Nevertheless, our assessment is that
there was a continuing decline in external debt. The reduction in private
debt resulted partly from the abrupt termination of access during the
crises, but also from the increased uncertainty that a ﬂoating exchange
regime introduces to borrowers. For agents that do not have dollar rev-
enues, it is highly risky to issue foreign currency debt. Thus, the trend is for
ﬁrms in the nontradable sector to repay their debts.
The public sector has also changed its behavior after the ﬂoat of the cur-
rency. Brazil returned to issuing sovereign bonds in 1995, but, since 1998,
issuance of public external debt has been dominated by compensatory
ﬂows. After a downward trend until 1997, the growth of public-sector debt
resumed during the crises under IMF programs. IMF debt rose from
nearly zero in 1997 to US$8.8 billion in 1999, falling back in the following
year with the repayments. However, in the subsequent programs, debt
owed to the IMF debt resumed an upward trend, peaking at US$33.5 bil-
lion in the third quarter of 2003. Between end 2000 and the third quarter of
2003, the IMF accounted for 90.1 percent of the US$35.2 billion increase
in public external debt. The repayments to the IMF in 2004 reduced total
public-sector debt by US$9.3 billion between the third quarters of 2003
and 2004. Overall, private debt was partly replaced by public debt.
In the aggregate, however, the total external debt level has been decreas-
ing since 2000. After peaking around US$225 billion in 1998–99, it reached
US$202.2 billion in September 2004. As a proportion of GDP, after reach-
ing 45.9 percent of GDP in 2002, total external debt decreased to 34.9 per-
cent in September 2004. The ratio of net external debt to GDP fell from
35.9 percent to 24.9 percent in the same period.
With the large expansion in exports in recent years, the ratio of gross ex-
ternal debt to twelve-month exports has declined substantially, as we can
see in ﬁgure 8.15, reaching 2.2 in September 2004, the lowest value in the
last thirty years, and 1.6 when considering net debt. Likewise, the propor-
tion of interest payments to exports has declined steadily. It reached 15.9
percent in September 2004, which also represents one of the lowest values
in the last three decades, as recorded in ﬁgure 8.16.
One wonders whether the remarkable decrease in debt since 2000 is the
sign of a new trend or the beginning of yet another cycle that eventually will
368 Ilan Goldfajn and André Minellareverse its course. It is diﬃcult to judge at this point. However, the combi-
nation of a few factors suggests a new trend. First, more incentives are be-
ing provided by the ﬂoating regime for borrowers to better assess risk, in
particular in the nontradable sector. Second, exports are increasing in a
magnitude not seen before, leading to a record low ratio (although still
high by international comparison) of external debt to exports. Third, the
larger role provided by net direct investment in the latest surge in capital
ﬂows is encouraging from a debt accumulation perspective.
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Fig. 8.15 Ratio of gross and net external debt to exports (1971–2004)
Fig. 8.16 Ratio of interest payments to exports (1970–2004)8.3 Capital Controls
During the 1990s, Brazil liberalized its capital account, in parallel to the
process of trade liberalization and the surge in capital inﬂows. The capital
account liberalization was a gradual process of establishing new rules on
capital inﬂows and outﬂows. Figure 8.17 shows an index of capital control
estimated for 1990–2004: the lower the index, the more liberalized is the
capital account.8The list of liberalization measures is vast, mostly adopted
in the ﬁrst half of the decade. Appendix A shows the current major re-
strictions, and appendix B presents a chronology of the main changes in
capital account regulation in the 1990–2004 period.
The result of the liberalization process was the following: (a) reduction
or elimination of taxes on foreign capital ﬁnancial transactions as well as
of minimum maturity requirements on loans; (b) elimination of quanti-
tative restrictions on investments by nonresidents in ﬁnancial and capi-
tal market securities issued domestically or abroad; (c) permission for
residents to issue securities abroad, including debt, without prior ap-
proval by the Central Bank; (d) more freedom for residents to invest in
FDI and portfolio abroad; and ﬁnally (d) introduction of currency con-
vertibility through the mechanism of international transfers in reais,
whereby residents could transfer their resources abroad through the use
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Fig. 8.17 Cumulative index of capital control: Normalization December 1989  
100 (January 1990–December 2004)
Note: Elaborated by the authors using the chronology in appendix B. We have normalized
December 1989 equal to 100 and have assigned –1 to each liberalizing measure and  1 to
each restrictive one. Thus, the lower the index value, the lower the level of capital control.
8. The index was elaborated using the chronology in appendix B. We have normalized De-
cember 1999 equal to 100 and assigned –1 to each liberalizing measure and  1 to each re-
strictive one.of nonresident accounts. Since March 2005 a more direct procedure has
been in place.
This liberalization process occurred, however, without the necessary
changes in the overall legislation. Each new liberalizing rule was inserted at
the margin of the existing legislative framework, resulting in a complex web
of regulations. The present set of regulations comprises diﬀerent types of
rules (laws, decree-laws, resolutions, memos, etc.) established in diﬀerent
contexts and driven by diverse motivations.
The existing legislative framework dates back as early as the 1930s. It
was originally based on less liberal principles and was implemented before
ﬁnancial integration was an important consideration. The most important
pillar of the existing legislation is that the domestic currency is the only le-
gal tender; that is, payments in foreign currency are not allowed.9 More-
over, banking deposits in foreign currency are usually not allowed.10 The
second pillar is that export proceeds are required to be converted into
domestic currency (export surrender; Decree 23,258, 10.19.33). Further-
more, the netting of payments is not allowed; for example, exporters can-
not use their proceeds to pay for an import or an external debt before con-
verting them into domestic currency (Decree-Law 9,025, 2.27.46).
However, the most important pieces of capital ﬂow legislation were in-
troduced in the 1960s to regulate FDI and loans (Laws 4,131 [9.3.62] and
4,390 [8.29.64], and Decree 55,762 [2.17.65]). According to that regulation,
foreign capital inﬂows should be registered (and income tax paid) in order
to obtain permission for associated outﬂows (proﬁts, interests, royalties,
and repatriation). This basic legislation has remained in place without ma-
jor changes.11 The legislation also laid the groundwork for the existence of
two separate exchange markets.
The 1960s legislation was enacted in the context of the Bretton Woods
system when private capital ﬂows were scarce and dominated by direct in-
vestment. Domestically, ﬁnancial markets were underdeveloped, currency
was weak—reﬂecting the eﬀects of inﬂation—and import substitution
policies at their peak. The basic idea was to control and limit currency con-
vertibility. Access to foreign currency was restricted to imports—heavily
taxed—and remittances, within certain limits, were associated with previ-
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9. Decree 23,501, 11.27.33, was replaced by Decree-Law 857, 9.11.69 (the exception was
given for some cases, such as contracts related to imports and exports, exchange contracts,
and debt involving nonresidents as creditor or debtor). Law 10,192, 2.14.01 (previously Pro-
visory Measure 1,053, 6.30.95) reaﬃrmed those restrictions, also making clear that the re-
striction involves indexation to a foreign currency.
10. There are few exceptions. Currently, foreign currency deposits are allowed for em-
bassies, international organisms, oil and electric energy companies, insurance companies, in-
stitutions operating in the ﬂoating exchange market, foreigners temporarily in Brazil, Brazil-
ians living abroad, the Brazilian postal service (ECT), and foreign cargo companies.
11. The main changes were the end of restrictions on investments in some sectors and a
lower tax burden.ous registered inﬂows. This legislation survived the next couple of decades,
when the scenario was dominated by the debt crisis and unstable macro-
economy.
Nevertheless, the strong capital controls system did not prevent capital
ﬂight. The “parallel” (or black) exchange market gained importance. The
exchange rate spread over the oﬃcial exchange rate averaged 40 percent
over the 1980s, peaking at 170 percent in May 1989 (Ipeadata, http://
www.ipeadata.gov.br). The high spread of the exchange rate over the oﬃ-
cial market encouraged import overinvoicing and export underinvoicing.
Even individuals who traveled abroad had to resort to the (illegal) parallel
market because of the extremely low limits on the amount of foreign cur-
rency that they were allowed to buy in the oﬃcial market.
The ﬁrst change in the regulation occurred in 1987, when portfolio in-
ﬂows were allowed through the establishment of foreign capital investment
companies, foreign capital investment funds, and stock and bond portfo-
lios (the so-called Annexes I to III). Other changes followed. An important
reference point was the liberalization of the securities market to foreign in-
stitutional investors in 1991, with the so-called Annex IV. Other important
measures that stimulated foreign capital ﬂows at the beginning of the 1990s
were the following: (a) reduction in the tax on remittances abroad of prof-
its and dividends; (b) authorization for conversion of external debt instru-
ments of the federal public sector, bonds, and deposits denominated in
foreign currency for use in the National Privatization Program; (c)
authorization for foreign investors represented by funds, investment com-
panies, and institutional investors to operate in the options and futures
markets for securities, exchange, and interest rates; and (d) authorization
for the issuance abroad of convertible debentures and of depository re-
ceipts representing Brazilian securities, such as the American depository
receipts (ADRs).
The creation of the ﬂoating exchange rate market—also called the
“dollar-tourism market”—at end 1988, alongside the commercial or free
exchange rate market, was another important reference point in the pro-
cess of capital account liberalization. The goal was to bring exchange
operations that were conducted in the parallel market into a regulated mar-
ket (Central Bank of Brazil 1993). Increasingly, the regulation broadened
the operations that could go through the new market. As a consequence,
the parallel market lost its economic signiﬁcance, as reﬂected in the spread,
which decreased signiﬁcantly, averaging 14 percent and 4 percent in the
ﬁrst and second halves of the 1990s. The rates in the ﬂoating and free
exchange markets were aligned in 1996, and the markets were in practice
uniﬁed in 1999 (Resolution 2,588, 1.25.99).
The ﬂoating exchange rate market allowed further liberalization of resi-
dents’ outﬂows. The main change was to broaden the possibility of con-
version of domestic into foreign currency through the nonresident ac-
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oping further in the following decade.12 The 1960s legislation determines
that nonresidents could transfer abroad, regardless of any authorization,
the balance not withdrawn coming from foreign exchange sales or money
orders in foreign currency. However, it did not establish what would hap-
pen to resources from other sources. At the end of the 1980s and the be-
ginning of the 1990s, the Central Bank extended the possibility of trans-
ferring abroad, giving a “general and public authorization” for transfers
from nonresident ﬁnancial institutions, as pointed out in Central Bank of
Brazil (1993), an important oﬃcial text that clariﬁed the changes in the ex-
change regime. Any transfers above US$10,000.00 (afterward changed to
R$10,000.00), however, should be identiﬁed and registered in the Central
Bank Information System (Sisbacen).
This transfer mechanism through the nonresident account was named
“international transfers in reais” (TIR). In practice, residents in Brazil
could deposit in a nonresident bank’s account held in a domestic bank that
could convert domestic into foreign currency. In other words, residents
could transfer money abroad by making these deposits and asking the non-
resident ﬁnancial institution to buy foreign currency to make the deposit
in an account abroad.13 This mechanism has represented a crucial change
in the capital account regulation: from a system based on strict limits to
currency conversion—restricted only to nonresidents and outﬂows related
to previous inﬂows—to a much broader scope, extended in practice also to
residents. As stressed in Franco and Pinho Neto (2004), this rule repre-
sented the introduction of de facto convertibility.
Convertibility was enhanced by the authorization for nonﬁnancial resi-
dent ﬁrms to invest abroad up to US$1 million each twelve months—later
expanded to US$5 million—without prior authorization. When above this
limit, investors had to provide information to the Central Bank thirty days
ahead of the exchange transaction.14 These investments were conducted in
the ﬂoating exchange rate market.15
From 1993 to 1996, however, capital inﬂows reached levels that
prompted the monetary authorities to adopt restrictive measures, some of
which were temporarily relaxed after the Mexican crisis.16 The vast liquid-
ity in international markets, the more open capital account, and the inter-
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12. See the section on resident and nonresident accounts in appendix B for the speciﬁc reg-
ulation.
13. For a more recent explanation of the international transfers in reais, see Schwartsman
(2004).
14. See the “Brazilian capital abroad” section in appendix B for more details.
15. From 1988 through 1992, Brazilian investment abroad was required to be compensated
by a sale to the Central Bank of gold bought in the domestic market for a value equivalent to
the investment.
16. See Ariyoshi et al. (2000), Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998), Garcia and Barcinski (1998),
and Garcia and Valpassos (1998).est diﬀerential between domestic and foreign interest rates led to a surge of
capital inﬂows that pressured the exchange rate and the money market.17
In fact, the restrictive measures were motivated by concerns regarding the
amount of sterilization operations—with their ﬁscal cost associated with
the yield diﬀerentials—and the short-term tenor of a signiﬁcant portion of
the inﬂows.
The restrictive measures involved quantitative and price-based mea-
sures, which constantly evolved as market participants found ways to cir-
cumvent them, as shown in Garcia and Valpassos (1998) and Carvalho
(2005).18 The regulatory changes discouraging capital inﬂows included (a)
an increase in the ﬁnancial transaction tax on capital inﬂows, in particular
for shorter-term ﬂows; (b) increases in the minimum maturity require-
ments for capital inﬂows; and (c) further quantitative restrictions on sev-
eral portfolio investment instruments. For example, foreign investment
under Annexes I to IV was prohibited from channeling resources to 
ﬁxed-yield bonds and debentures (although partially compensated by the
creation of speciﬁc foreign capital ﬁxed-income funds [FRF-CE]). These
prohibitions were gradually expanded over the period 1993–95, with suc-
cessive measures restricting investment in derivatives markets—unless as
an explicit hedge of existing contracts—certiﬁcates of privatization and re-
lated securities, Financial Investment Funds (FAF), futures and options
markets, and ﬁnally other speciﬁc debt securities.
Measures aimed at stimulating outﬂows, such as the permission for pre-
payment of foreign borrowing and import ﬁnancing, were also adopted.
New channels for Brazilian investment abroad were established, such as
the Brazilian depositary receipts (BDRs) regulation, which allowed resi-
dents to purchase securities of nonresident companies in Brazil, and the
creation of Foreign Investment Funds, which facilitates purchases of debt
securities by residents in international markets.
The measures easing outﬂows make it clear that the overall objective was
to reduce net inﬂows without aﬀecting the trend toward greater integration
with international ﬁnancial markets. In fact, the restrictive measures did
not reverse the liberalization trend, but represented a cycle of restrictions
around that trend, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.17. Furthermore, ﬁgure 8.18de-
composes the index into controls on outﬂows and inﬂows, showing that the
focus of the measures was inﬂows.
The restrictive capital inﬂow measures did not involve FDI. On the con-
trary, the liberalization trend continued through the mid-1990s. The con-
stitutional distinction between Brazilian ﬁrms—licensed under Brazilian
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17. Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998) and Garcia and Barcinski (1998) have shown that capital
ﬂows to Brazil responded to interest rate diﬀerentials. Our estimations also provide evidence
that domestic interest rates have stimulated capital ﬂows.
18. Carvalho (2005) presents diﬀerent strategies used by market agents to circumvent the
regulation.laws and with headquarters and administration in the country—and
Brazilian ﬁrms of national capital—restricted to those under the control of
residents—were removed. Likewise, new opportunities for investment in
public utilities were opened with the Concession Law, as well as with the
increase in the ceiling for nonresidents’ ownership of ﬁnancial institutions.
Moreover, the income tax on remittance of proﬁts and dividends abroad
was removed.
The motivation for the restrictions adopted in this period stands in sharp
contrast to that of the 1960s legislation. The latter was established in the
context of a scarcity of foreign resources in order to prevent capital out-
ﬂows—so-called capital ﬂight. The objective was to restrict currency con-
vertibility to avoid pressures on the exchange rate—and their conse-
quences on inﬂation and import costs—and try to preserve the demand for
domestic currency. In contrast, the 1993–96 restrictions were aimed at re-
ducing capital inﬂows and easing outﬂows. In fact, as shown in Cardoso
and Goldfajn (1998), capital controls were endogenous. The government
reacted strongly to capital ﬂows by increasing controls on inﬂows when
these were booming and relaxing them in moments of distress. However,
Cardoso and Goldfajn (1998) also show that, although the volume and
composition of capital ﬂows responded to the restrictive measures, these
measures were ineﬀective in the long run.
Starting in 1997, capital controls on inﬂows were again relaxed with the
outbreak of the Asian and Russian crises, and later on with the Brazilian
exchange crisis. The measures from 1997 through 1999 included reduction
and later elimination of both the minimum average maturity for external
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Fig. 8.18 Cumulative index of capital control on inﬂows and outﬂows: Normaliza-
tion December 1989   100 (January 1990–December 2004)
Note: See ﬁgure 8.17 notes.loans and the ﬁnancial transaction tax on capital inﬂows, and elimination
of the restrictions on investments under Annexes I to IV.19 In 1999, the
1993–96 restrictive measures had all been lifted. The greater capital ac-
count openness culminated in Brazil accepting the obligations of IMF Ar-
ticle of Agreement VIII in November 1999.20
In the ﬁrst ﬁve years of the twenty-ﬁrst century, under the new ﬂoating
exchange regime adopted in 1999, nonresidents were ﬁnally allowed to in-
vest in the same instruments in the ﬁnancial and capital markets that resi-
dents do. In addition, the prepayment of external debt was allowed, and the
conditions for the issuance of Brazilian real–denominated external debt
were set. Also, an important development of that period was the elimina-
tion of prior approval of external loans by the Central Bank of Brazil. In
eﬀect, the current registration process for capital ﬂows has become a doc-
umentary requirement instead of part of an active authorization process.
More recently, at the beginning of March 2005, the Central Bank an-
nounced the uniﬁcation of the exchange markets and clearer rules con-
cerning the conversion of domestic currency into foreign currency. For ex-
ample, the international transfer mechanism through deposits in accounts
of nonresident ﬁnancial institutions was replaced by a more direct proce-
dure.
In spite of the substantial liberalization of the 1990s, Arida, Bacha, and
Lara-Resende (2005) point out that the resulting system does not mean un-
restricted or free convertibility. The authors list several limits of the current
system, including the fact that current convertibility is based on the mone-
tary authority’s rules instead of laws, and these rules can be lifted at any
time. In addition, public opinion still associates transfers abroad with illicit
or antipatriotic practices.21
In fact, notwithstanding some eﬀorts to consolidate the exchange and
capital account rules, regulation is still fragmented and involves rules set
in diﬀerent contexts and driven by various motivations. A consolidation
of the whole regulation in a uniﬁed law is necessary. Reduction in bureau-
cratic requirements is needed as well. The rules would become less uncer-
tain and clearer. These changes would facilitate the change in mentality,
which originated back in the capital ﬂight period, that associates transfers
abroad with illicit or antipatriotic practices.
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19. A 5 percent tax is applied to inﬂows related to external loans with a minimum coverage
maturity of up to ninety days.
20. This article precludes the country members from imposing restrictions without the ap-
proval of the IMF on the making of payments and transfers for current international trans-
actions. It also forbids discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices.
Previously, Brazil availed itself of the transitional arrangements of Article XIV, which allows
exchange restrictions but requires countries to take measures toward acceptance of Article
VIII as soon as conditions permit.
21. See Gleizer (2005) for a collection of papers on exchange arrangements and capital ﬂow
regulation in Brazil.A further step could be adopted. Arida (2003a, 2003b, 2004) defends a
change in legislation to assure unrestricted convertibility. He argues that
the introduction by law of free convertibility—deﬁned as the absence of
any restriction on the exchange between foreign and domestic currencies,
although keeping the domestic currency as the only means of domestic
payments—would give a positive signal. Arida (2003a, 2004) stresses that
free convertibility should not be adopted immediately, but should be an-
nounced beforehand and implemented gradually, accompanying some
macroeconomic indicators and institutional changes, such as central bank
independence.22
Our view is that much can and should be done in order to simplify and
consolidate current exchange regulations. The system is excessively bu-
reaucratic and complicated, as a consequence of the patchwork way it was
created as macroeconomic conditions evolved and ideology changed. At
this juncture the advances of the last decade should be uniﬁed in a consol-
idated and simple law. Further liberalization steps beyond consolidation
will need to be accompanied by additional institutional developments such
as establishing central bank autonomy, solidifying the ﬁscal responsibility
law and the need for a mature ﬁscal policy, reaching a stronger consensus
about the necessity of lower inﬂation, and implementing judiciary reform
and further microeconomic reforms. Complete freedom of capital ﬂows
should emerge as a “natural” consequence of improvements and maturity
in institutions.
The history of capital controls in Brazil can be summarized thus: (a) lib-
eralization has advanced signiﬁcantly since the 1990s; (b) the restrictive
measures of the 1993–96 period were mostly aimed at reducing large capi-
tal inﬂows and did not reverse the liberalization trend; (c) currency con-
vertibility has increased signiﬁcantly; (d) the current situation calls for a
simpliﬁcation of the exchange market and elimination of existing bureau-
cracy; and (e) the advances achieved in the last decade (through several
rules) should be consolidated into a simple law approved by Congress.
8.4 Volatility of Capital Flows and Financial Crises
The great volatility of capital ﬂows has been one of the main arguments
for those who oppose complete liberalization of capital movements. Is the
volatility of capital ﬂows in Brazil a permanent feature? Is the volatility siz-
able across the diﬀerent types of ﬂows?
Besides the normal volatility analysis, it is important to verify the be-
havior of capital ﬂows in periods of stress, such as in ﬁnancial crises. This
provides more qualitative information regarding the whole distribution of
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22. Arida’s proposal has generated some controversy. An opposite view can be found in
Ferrari Filho et al. (2005).the ﬂows. The Brazilian economy was aﬀected by four external and two
domestic crises in the last twelve years: (a) the Mexican crisis, in late 1994;
(b) the Asian crisis, in the last quarter of 1997; (c) the Russian crisis, in the
third quarter of 1998; (d) the Brazilian exchange crisis, in late 1998 to early
1999; (e) the Argentinean crisis, in the second half of 2001; and (f) the
Brazilian conﬁdence crisis, in the last three quarters of 2002. Figure 8.19
depicts monthly averages of the EMBI  Brazil, whose peaks reﬂect the
crises.23In this section we conduct some basic estimates of volatility of cap-
ital ﬂows and assess their behavior during the crises.
8.4.1 Volatility of Capital Flows
The results on volatility are shown in table 8.4 for the 1992:Q1–2004:Q2
period (quarterly data). Considering the coeﬃcient of variation (ratio of
standard deviation to average), net direct investment is the less volatile
group, in line with the results of Prasad et al. (2003), who use a data set of
seventy-six industrial and developing countries to show that bank borrow-
ing and portfolio ﬂows are substantially more volatile than FDI. Portfolio
investment is the most volatile group. The standard deviation and coeﬃ-
cient of variation of portfolio investment are 1.3 and 2.0 times higher than
those for direct investment. Note that loans are extremely volatile as well.
Thus, according to these indicators, ﬁnancing through debt securities is
not more volatile than via loans. Furthermore, the variance of direct in-
vestment is actually underestimated because its average in the second half
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Fig. 8.19 EMBI Brazil (January 1994–October 2004): Sovereign spread
23. The series refers to the sovereign spread of the EMBI until December 1997 and of the
EMBI  thereafter. For simplicity, we call it EMBI throughout the text.of the sample is substantially higher than in the ﬁrst half. For the 1997:Q1–
2004:Q2 sample, its variation coeﬃcient decreases to 0.5, whereas that of
portfolio investment rises to 3.0.
When we use net ﬂows, however, the variation coeﬃcient is sensitive to
averages close to zero. To minimize this problem, we estimate separately
the volatility for inﬂows and outﬂows, which are shown in table 8.5. Simi-
lar to net ﬂows, inﬂows and outﬂows of portfolio investment present a stan-
dard deviation signiﬁcantly higher than that for FDI.24 Likewise, contrary
to expectations, the item “other long-term loans,” when compared to the
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Table 8.4 Volatilities of net capital ﬂows (quarterly data, 1992:Q1–2004:Q2, 
in US$ millions at 2003 prices)
Other 
Direct Equity Debt Portfolio  Trade  short-term  Short-term  Long-term 
investment securities securities investment Loans credit assets ﬂows ﬂows
Standard 
deviation 3,077 1,668 3,718 4,084 2,813 2,284 1,799 4,582 5,166
Mean 3,717 947 1,559 2,488 –100 2,601 –1,712 1,645 1,102
Variation 
coeﬃcient 0.83 1.76 2.39 1.64 –28.12 0.88 –1.05 2.78 4.69
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and authors’ calculations.
Note: See table 8.3 note.
Table 8.5 Volatilities of inﬂows and outﬂows (quarterly data, 1992:Q1–2004:Q2, 
in US$ millions at 2003 prices)
Long-term Long-term 
Foreign Foreign  Brazilian  Other suppliers’ buyers’ 
direct portfolio  company  Debt  long-term trade  trade 
investment investment equity securities loans credits credits
Inﬂows
Standard deviation 3,852 5,007 3,112 2,916 846 893 1,006
Mean 5,253 10,046 5,356 4,690 1,027 693 952
Variation coeﬃcient 0.73 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.82 1.29 1.06
Outﬂows
Standard deviation 965 4,310 2,719 2,731 649 677 927
Mean 1,287 7,371 4,268 2,343 1,051 722 1,116
Variation coeﬃcient 0.75 0.58 0.64 1.17 0.62 0.94 0.83
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and authors’ calculations.
Note: See table 8.3 note.
24. Although the variation of coeﬃcient of inﬂows and outﬂows of portfolio investments is
lower than that of FDI, when we consider the 1997:Q1–2004:Q2 period, the result is reversed.
Furthermore, under the point of view of pressures on the balance of payments, the standard
deviation measure seems to be more relevant because it captures the absolute amount of
change in the ﬂows.group portfolio investment, does not present higher volatility.25 Note also
that trade credits present a high variation coeﬃcient.
The literature has emphasized the volatility of short-term ﬂows and their
role during ﬁnancial crises. The ﬁgures on the greater stability of FDI ﬂows
support this analysis. However, the same does not apply when we compare
short- versus long-term debt ﬂows. Long-term debt ﬂows present a higher
standard deviation and coeﬃcient of variation. On the other hand, when
including the groups “other short-term assets” and net direct investment in
the short- and long-term ﬂows, respectively, the volatility is signiﬁcantly
lower in the latter. Nevertheless, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.12, net short-term
debt ﬂows have been relatively more stable since mid-1999 when compared
to the previous period.
We also conduct some basic analysis of the correlation between selected
groups (table 8.6). The groups equities, debt securities, loans, and trade
credits are positively correlated, although the correlation coeﬃcients are
not large.26 Net direct investment, in turn, usually presents negative corre-
lation with those groups. The correlation between short- and long-term
ﬂows (not shown) is signiﬁcantly higher, mainly when we use annual data
(correlation coeﬃcient of 0.73). This result strengthens the previous ﬁnd-
ings concerning similar volatilities of short- and long-term debt ﬂows.
8.4.2 Capital Flows during Crises
Sudden stops were more intense during the domestic crises than during
the external ones. Table 8.7 shows net ﬂows previous to and during the
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25. Although other long-term loan inﬂows present a higher coeﬃcient of variation than
that of portfolio investment, when considering outﬂows they present similar coeﬃcients. Fur-
thermore, in both cases the standard deviation of other long-term loans is lower than that of
portfolio investment.
26. Bosworth and Collins (1999) have found no or very low correlation between FDI, port-
folio investment, and loans for a sample of ﬁfty-eight developing countries.
Table 8.6 Correlations across capital ﬂows (quarterly data, 1992:Q1–2004:Q2, 
at 2003 prices)
Equity Debt  Trade  Portfolio Direct 
securities securities Loans credit investment investment
Equity securities 1.00 0.27 0.34 0.43 0.48 –0.28
Debt securities 0.27 1.00 0.36 0.15 0.97 –0.11
Loans 0.34 0.36 1.00 0.15 0.41 –0.38
Trade credit 0.43 0.15 0.15 1.00 0.24 0.16
Portfolio investments 0.48 0.97 0.41 0.24 1.00 –0.17
Direct investments –0.28 –0.11 –0.38 0.16 –0.17 1.00
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and authors’ calculations.
Notes: See table 8.3 note.crises. In the domestic crises, the expectation of a change in regime and de-
preciation of domestic currency stimulated capital outﬂows and discour-
aged capital inﬂows signiﬁcantly. Net ﬂows during the Mexican and Asian
crises were negative only for one or two quarters, and recovered quickly—
four-quarter cumulative ﬂows remained positive. In contrast, during the
exchange crisis (1999)—considering also the Russian crisis period—and
the conﬁdence crisis (2002), the reversal of ﬂows was large and lasted at
least three quarters. From 1998:Q3 through 1999:Q1, the cumulative pri-
vate capital account balance stood at –$23.2 billion (in U.S. dollars), after
having accumulated US$48.1 billion in the previous four quarters. In the
second half of 2002, ﬂows reached –$12.7 billion, following US$13.1 bil-
lion accumulated in the previous four quarters.
The reversal in capital ﬂows in the exchange crisis was higher than in the
conﬁdence crisis for the following reasons. (a) The economy was receiving
large inﬂows, in part because of the huge spread between domestic and for-
eign interest rates. (b) In mid-1998, despite FDI growth, most of the ﬂows
consisted of portfolio investment, loans, and trade credits, which tend to
respond more quickly and intensely to crises. In contrast, FDI comprised
a large part of the ﬂows when the conﬁdence crisis took place. (c) After
some point in time most agents considered the collapse of the exchange
regime unavoidable, with the corresponding strong devaluation of domes-
tic currency, and remaining doubts were mainly about when it would take
place. In this context, protection of asset values meant large positive net
capital outﬂows. In contrast, the conﬁdence crisis occurred in a diﬀerent
regime, and was reversed as the elected government displayed some strong
signs of continuity in macroeconomic policy. (d) The exchange deprecia-
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Table 8.7 Private capital account balance in Brazil and crises (in US$ millions at
current prices)
Private capital account balance
Four-quarter Quarterly 
average before  average during 
the crisis the crisis Diﬀerence
Crisis Period (A) (B) (A) – (B)
Mexican 1994:Q4–1995:Q1 4,242 196 4,046
Asian 1997:Q4 9,000 1,364 7,636
Russian 1998:3 12,014 –17,290 29,304
Exchange crisis 1999:1 4,662 –5,499 10,161
1998:3–1999:1 12,014 –7,724 19,738
Argentinian 2001:4 6,264 1,454 4,810
Conﬁdence crisis 2002:3–2002:4 3,271 –6,363 9,634
2002:2–2002:4 3,918 –3,045 6,962
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and authors’ calculations.tion during the conﬁdence crisis, after some point in time, tended to dis-
courage outﬂows and stimulate inﬂows. In the exchange crisis, the decision
of sticking to the pegged system did not allow this mechanism.
In general, the literature has emphasized the role of short-term ﬂows
during the ﬁnancial crises. In fact, in Brazil, FDI has been more stable than
other ﬂows. Nevertheless, debt securities, loans, and trade credits with ma-
turity superior to 360 days—classiﬁed as long-term ﬂows—have exerted
an important role during the crises as well. In the moments of crisis, long-
term debt inﬂows tended to decline as much as short-term inﬂows. Actu-
ally, they may fall more, as their horizon is longer and therefore they are
more sensitive to uncertainties. The diﬀerence, of course, is that, with
longer-term debt, outﬂows are better distributed over time—lower re-
payments and pressure for debt rollover—tending to reduce net outﬂows
in the short run. However,  the long-term category of the balance-
of-payments statistics includes ﬂows as short as one year, which are not
enough to allow great extension of maturity.
The group “other short-term assets” exerted an important role, mainly
in the exchange crisis. In fact, 44.3 percent of the deﬁcit of US$25.1 billion
in the private capital balance from 1998:Q8 through 1999:Q1 consisted of
this category, which is related to the so-called CC5 (Circular Letter 5) ac-
counts.
Sudden stops involve both the interruption of capital inﬂows and an in-
crease in outﬂows. Figure 8.20 shows the behavior of inﬂows and outﬂows
of foreign investments in Brazilian corporate equities, debt securities, and
long-term loans. In general, both inﬂows and outﬂows have played an im-
portant role. Outﬂows of investments in equities closely followed inﬂows,
placing in evidence their short-term nature. The reduction in inﬂows was
substantially higher in the exchange crisis and took place before any in-
crease in outﬂows, which actually started declining as inﬂows reduced. In
the case of debt securities, the fall in inﬂows was large during both domes-
tic crises. Since outﬂows depend on the due dates, a decrease in inﬂows
took place before an increase in outﬂows for both debt securities and long-
term loans.
In sum, we ﬁnd in this section that in general FDI ﬂows tend to be more
stable and less correlated to the other ﬂows. Long-term debt ﬂows worked
as a stabilizing factor during external crises but behaved procyclically dur-
ing domestic crises. Moreover, sudden stops are more pronounced when
the crisis is mostly domestically driven.
8.5 Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Performance
The analysis of capital ﬂows in Brazil naturally brings up a set of impor-
tant questions. What has been the role of capital ﬂows in Brazil? What have
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variables? This section deals with these questions.
Initially, we investigate whether capital ﬂows have ﬁnanced a change in
reserves or the capital account balance. Thereafter, using the national ac-
counts, we examine whether current account deﬁcits have ﬁnanced con-
sumption or investment or even reﬂected greater deﬁcit in income account.
A
B
Fig. 8.20 A, Foreign portfolio investment, Brazilian company equities: Inﬂows ver-
sus outﬂows (four-quarter cumulative balance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices);
B, foreign portfolio investment, debt securities: Inﬂows versus outﬂows (four-quarter
cumulative balance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices); C, other foreign invest-
ments: Other long-term loans, inﬂows versus outﬂows (four-quarter cumulative bal-
ance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)
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versus Current Account Balance
Capital ﬂows can be associated with the current account balance or
changes in international reserves. In particular, positive net ﬂows can be
used to ﬁnance reserve accumulation or current account deﬁcits. Figure
8.21 shows that short movements in capital ﬂows have implied changes in
reserves, whereas movements of lower frequency are associated with cur-
rent account deﬁcits. Using quarterly data, table 8.8 records the correla-
tion of private capital account with the current account balance and re-
serve changes for diﬀerent periods. Private capital account and reserve
changes are highly correlated contemporaneously. As expected, this corre-
lation is higher in the 1992–98 period—dominated by managed exchange
systems—than in the ﬂoating exchange rate period. As reserves respond
less, the contemporaneous correlation between capital ﬂows and current
account deﬁcits is higher in the latter period. Likewise, the lagged and lead-
ing correlations are higher in the recent period. These results indicate that,
during the ﬂoating exchange regime, capital ﬂows have been associated
with quicker and larger changes in the current account.
To have some indication of when net capital ﬂows ﬁnanced reserve ac-
cumulation versus current account deﬁcits, we have calculated, for each
year, the ratios of both reserve change and current account deﬁcit to the
capital and ﬁnancial account balance (including errors and omissions).
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C
Fig. 8.20 (cont) A, Foreign portfolio investment, Brazilian company equities: In-
ﬂows versus outﬂows (four-quarter cumulative balance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003
prices); B, foreign portfolio investment, debt securities: Inﬂows versus outﬂows
(four-quarter cumulative balance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices); C, other for-
eign investments: Other long-term loans, inﬂows versus outﬂows (four-quarter cu-
mulative balance, 1990:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)Figure 8.22 depicts the results for 1990–2003. The left axis shows the share
of net ﬂows used to ﬁnance current account deﬁcits. Negative values cor-
respond to years of positive current account balance (1992 and 2003), and
values greater than 100 percent refer to periods of current account deﬁcit
and reduction in reserves (1991, 1997–99). The values in the right axis—
shown in inverse scale—represent the share of net ﬂows that translated
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Fig. 8.21 Capital and ﬁnancial account, current account deﬁcit and reserve
changes (four-quarter cumulative balance, 1970:Q4–2004:Q2, at 2003 prices)
Table 8.8 Correlation between private capital account and the items current account and
change in reserves
Private capital account
1974:Q1–1991:Q4 1992:Q1–2004:Q2 1992:Q1–1998:Q4 1999:Q1–2004:Q2
Current account
lag (–4) –0.178 0.005 0.039 –0.216
lag (–3) –0.320 –0.190 –0.193 –0.312
lag (–2) –0.334 –0.238 –0.267 –0.365
lag (–1) –0.384 –0.284 –0.280 –0.501
Contemporary –0.367 –0.262 –0.148 –0.544
lead ( 1) –0.351 –0.235 –0.130 –0.501
lead ( 2) –0.442 –0.338 –0.361 –0.460
lead ( 3) –0.458 –0.381 –0.353 –0.507
lead ( 4) –0.486 –0.418 –0.316 –0.454
Change in reserves, 
Contemporary 0.329 0.704 0.766 0.427
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and authors’ calculations.
Note: Current account is seasonally adjusted.into reserve increases. Negative values refer to periods of a reduction in re-
serves. Note, however, that the ﬁgure shows only proportions and not the
amount of the values involved.
Capital ﬂows were used basically to ﬁnance current account deﬁcits, es-
pecially during the cycle from 1995 through 2002. The exception to the rule
was from 1992 through 1994, when most net ﬂows were employed to ﬁ-
nance reserve accumulation. Actually, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.23, there
was an intense process of reserve accumulation from 1992 through 1996.
Reserves rose from US$9.4 billion at end 1991 to US$60.1 billion at end
386 Ilan Goldfajn and André Minella
Fig. 8.22 Share of the capital and ﬁnance account balance used for current ac-
count and for change in reserves (1990–2003)
Fig. 8.23 International reserves: Liquidity concept (six-month moving average,
May 1971:5–March 2004:9, at 2003 prices)1996, and were fundamental for the implementation of Real Plan. The
other exception took place in 2003, eased by positive current account re-
sults.27
8.5.2 What Have Capital Flows Financed? Consumption or Investment?
After averaging 0.6 percent over 1990–94, the ratio of current account
deﬁcit to GDP rose by 2.8 percentage points in the 1995–97 period, reach-
ing 4.1 percent in the latter year. The high deﬁcits continued in the follow-
ing years, averaging 4.4 percent over 1998–2001. They reverted in 2002,
with a deﬁcit of 1.2 percent, and turned into surplus in the following years.
This section uses the national accounts to have an indication of the main
aggregate components that accounted for the deﬁcits. National account
statistics, however, have to be used with care because they do not neces-
sarily reﬂect relationships of causality.
We use the well-known basic identities of the national accounts:28
CA   S   I
GNDY   GDP   NYCT
S   GNDY   C
C   Ch   Cg,
where CA   current account balance, S   gross domestic saving, I   in-
vestment, GNDY   gross national disposable income, GDP   gross do-
mestic product, NYCT   net income from abroad and net current trans-
fers,  C   consumption,  Ch   household consumption, and Cg  
government consumption.
Tables 8.9 and 8.10 divide the current account deﬁcit period into two
phases: (a) 1995–97, characterized by a large increase in the deﬁcit and in
domestic expenditure rates; and (b) 1998–2001, characterized by some in-
crease in the deﬁcit and by a prominent role of the deﬁcit in the net income
from abroad. We estimate the contribution of the variables to the increase
in the current account deﬁcit comparing the ﬁrst phase to 1990–94, and the
second phase to the ﬁrst one.
According to table 8.9, the increase in the current account deﬁcit in the
ﬁrst period corresponded to both an increase in the investment ratio and a
reduction in domestic saving. The rise in the investment ratio responded
for 43.2 percent of the deﬁcit increase in the period. In contrast, in the sec-
ond period, the reduction in domestic saving was accompanied by a de-
crease, at a lower value, in the investment ratio. Table 8.10 allows us to dis-
criminate the elements behind the reduction in domestic saving.
The current account deﬁcit cycle was accompanied by an increase of 2.1
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27. During the 1980s, the exception was 1984–85, with high trade balance surpluses.
28. See, for instance, IMF (1993).percentage points in the consumption share in the GDP, which took place
basically in 1995 and 1996, as we can see in ﬁgure 8.24.29 In fact, under the
point of view of the national accounts, consumption—household and gov-
ernment—accounted for the larger part (74.6 percent) of the increase in
the current account deﬁcit. On the other hand, because the share of con-
sumption is approximately four times higher than that of investment, the
percentage increase in the consumption ratio was lower than that of in-
vestment (2.7 percent against 5.9 percent). The combination of an increase
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Table 8.9 Domestic saving and investment as a share of GDP and their contribution
to the increase in the current account (CA) deﬁcit, 1990–2001
Current account  Domestic 
deﬁcit saving Investment
(A)   (C) – (B) (B) (C)
1. 1990–1994 (%) 0.6 19.8 20.4
2. 1995–1997 (%) 3.4 18.2 21.6
3. 1998–2001 (%) 4.4 16.6 21.0
Row 2 minus row 1 2.8 –1.6 1.2
Contribution to the increase in 
the CA deﬁcit (%) 100.0 56.8 43.2
Row 3 minus row 2 1.1 –1.6 –0.6
Contribution to the increase in 
the CA deﬁcit (%) 100.0 153.2 –53.2
Sources: IBGE and authors’ calculations.
Table 8.10 Components of national accounts as a share of GDP and their contribution to the
increase in the current account (CA) deﬁcit, 1990–2001
Current 
account Income  Household  Government 
deﬁcit deﬁcit Investment Consumption consumption consumption
1. 1990–1994 (%) 0.6 1.8 20.4 78.4 60.4 18.0
2. 1995–1997 (%) 3.4 1.4 21.6 80.4 61.7 18.8
3. 1998–2001 (%) 4.4 2.9 21.0 80.6 61.4 19.1
Row 2 minus row 1 2.8 –0.5 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.8
Contribution to the 
increase in the CA 
deﬁcit (%) 100.0 –17.8 43.2 74.6 45.5 29.1
Row 3 minus row 2 1.1 1.5 –0.6 0.1 –0.3 0.4
Contribution to the 
increase in the CA 
deﬁcit (%) 100.0 143.3 –53.2 9.9 –17.3 139.9
Sources: IBGE and authors’ calculations.
29. Note that the values in the right axis refer to the consumption ratio.in investment and consumption comprised 117.8 percent of the deﬁcit in-
crease (net income from abroad contributed with –17.8 percent).
In the 1998–2001 period, however, it was an increase in the net income
deﬁcit that accounted for most of the increase in the current account
deﬁcit. The ratio of net income deﬁcit to GDP rose by 1.5 percentage
points, reﬂecting basically the debt accumulation and foreign investments
of the previous period, besides some movements related to the domestic
crises.
In summary, the role of net ﬁnancial ﬂows in the 1990s was to ﬁnance (a)
a strong accumulation of international reserves between 1992 and 1996; (b)
a large expansion of the current account deﬁcit over 1995–97, representing
an expansion of both investment and consumption; and (c) an increase in
the current account deﬁcit over 1998–2001, resulting from a higher deﬁcit
in the net income from abroad.
8.5.3 GDP Growth
Since the 1980s, the Brazilian economy has experienced short-lived busi-
ness cycles. Figure 8.25 shows the four-quarter moving average of GDP
growth and the four-quarter cumulative balance of the private capital ac-
count since 1992. Economic expansions have lasted approximately two
years. The ﬁgure also shows that there is an association between capital
ﬂows and output movements. The two expansions before the adoption of
the ﬂoating exchange rate regime beneﬁted from the large capital inﬂows.
Figure 8.3 shows clearly the appreciation trend and the large trade deﬁcit
of the period.
In comparison to the 1990s growth episodes, economic growth in 2000–
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Fig. 8.24 Components of national accounts as a proportion of GDP (1990–2003)2001 and at the time of this writing (2004) took place in a diﬀerent context.
First, net capital ﬂows have been of lower magnitude and have been dom-
inated by FDI. Actually, since 1998, net direct investment has comprised
more than 100 percent of the private capital account balance. There has
been no signiﬁcant surge of short-term ﬂows or portfolio investment. Sec-
ond, the expansions have been accompanied by a more favorable situation
in the trade balance. Third, the policy regime has changed to improve fun-
damentals. Furthermore, the economic slowdown was less intense in the
Brazilian conﬁdence crisis than in other countries’ sudden-stop crises. Fig-
ure 8.26 shows GDP growth in the year following the crises for a few com-
parable cases.
8.5.4 Consumption Smoothing
Based on the intertemporal approach to the current account, capital
ﬂows are deemed to bring about greater consumption smoothing.30 When
facing idiosyncratic shocks, a country’s consumers can borrow (or lend)
abroad and reduce consumption volatility. Table 8.11 shows consumption
volatility for three periods. We compare volatility after capital account
openness with the periods of absence of capital ﬂows and of the 1970s debt
accumulation. In fact, consumption—its growth rate or share in GDP—is
more stable in the recent period than in the 1980s.31The standard deviation
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Fig. 8.25 Private capital account balance (four-quarter cumulative balance 
at 2003 prices) and GDP growth rate (four-quarter moving average, 
1992:Q1–2004:Q2)
30. See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1994, 1996).
31. In contrast, Prasad et al. (2003) have found that the median of the consumption volatil-
ity of twenty-two more ﬁnancially integrated developing countries—which include Brazil—
increased in the 1990s in comparison to the 1980s.of consumption growth is also lower after the capital account liberalization
in comparison to the 1970s, even though the variation coeﬃcient is slightly
higher because of the lower growth rate.32
8.5.5 What Determines Capital Flows and Their Components?
To assess the main determinants of capital ﬂows, we have estimated re-
gressions for selected items: private capital account, oﬃcial agency–related
loans, net foreign direct investment, and net foreign investment in debt se-
curities, equities, and loans. In particular, we are interested in the role
played by the external and domestic interest rates and the crises. The main
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Fig. 8.26 GDP growth after crises
32. One should be cautious about these comparisons because the periods may involve
diﬀerent moments in the cycle, and of course GDP has additional determinants. In particu-
lar, the 1983–91 period was marked by external adjustment resulting from the debt crisis and
by the recession brought about by the Collor Plan in 1990. On the other hand, the 1970s was
a period of great economic expansion, and the last decade was featured by several ﬁnancial
crises.
Table 8.11 Growth rate and volatility of consumption and GDP in Brazil, 1974–2003
Consumption 
Consumption growth rate share in GDP GDP growth rate
Standard Coeﬃcient Standard Standard  Coeﬃcient 
Average deviation of variation Average deviation Average deviation of variation
1974–1982 4.95 5.30 1.07 78.5 1.4 5.03 4.49 0.89
1983–1991 2.18 4.30 1.97 75.3 3.7 2.27 4.31 1.90
1992–2003 2.20 2.54 1.15 79.3 1.6 2.43 2.08 0.86
Sources: IBGE and authors’ calculations.results are recorded in table 8.12. We have used as explanatory variables the
Federal Reserve funds rate, domestic interest rate minus expected depreci-
ation,33and EMBI  Brazil (sovereign spread). Although the EMBI is also
aﬀected by the Federal Reserve funds rate, it tends to basically reﬂect the
several crises. The correlation coeﬃcient between the Federal Reserve
funds rate and the EMBI is –0.208. Thus, we do not include dummies for
the crises, whose speciﬁcation implies some arbitrariness and may distort
the estimations.34
392 Ilan Goldfajn and André Minella
Table 8.12 Determinants of capital ﬂows (January 1995–August 2004)
Dependent variable
Private Oﬃcial-
capital Debt  Direct  agency 
Regressor account securities Equities  Loans  investment  loans
Constant 1,938.9∗ 506.3∗ 488.2 122.2 1,237.0∗∗ –882.4
(1,164.9) (262.3) (701.8) (450.8) (537.9) (865.9)
U.S. interest rate 238.7 –14.0 147.4∗ 86.1 332.3∗∗∗ –81.9
(175.7) (38.8) (78.0) (77.3) (64.8) (126.5)
Domestic interest ratea 95.5∗∗ 20.7∗∗ 30.0∗ 33.7∗∗ –70.2∗∗∗ 19.7
(39.1) (8.7) (16.3) (15.6) (10.4) (29.6)
EMBI  Brazil –426.6∗∗∗ –0.7∗∗∗ –1.7∗∗ –1.6∗∗∗ 1.0∗ 114.2∗∗
(127.8) (0.3) (0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (55.5)
R2 0.3201 0.1857 0.1914 0.2302 0.1810 0.0518
Adjusted R2 0.3015 0.1635 0.1693 0.2092 0.1587 0.0260
Unit root test for the 
dependent variable: 
p-valueb 0.0071 0.0000 0.0984 0.0146 0.2343 0.0302
Notes: Standard errors (shown in parentheses) were corrected by Newey-West heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator. Estimation using two-stage least squares. In-
strumental variables: constant U.S. interest rate and the variable domestic rate and EMBI lagged one
and two periods. The variables Debt Securities, Equities, Loans, and Direct Investment refer to net for-
eign investment.
aMinus expected exchange rate depreciation.
bp-value found using the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Number of lags selected according to modiﬁed
AIC, which generated the same number of lags as modiﬁed SIC.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
33. Calculated using the Selic in the ﬁrst working day of the month divided by the expected
exchange rate change, measured as the ratio between the forward rate for contracts due at the
beginning of the following month and the spot rate. All dependent variables are measured at
constant U.S. prices.
34. Initially, we conducted unit root tests (augmented Dickey-Fuller formulation), basi-
cally to avoid incurring spurious regression. We reject the null for all dependent variables ex-
cept for direct investment. In the case of the regressors, we accept the null of presence of a unit
root in the U.S. and domestic interest rates, and reject it for the EMBI. In the estimations, weThe role played by the EMBI and the domestic interest rate is evident. In
the regressions of the variables representing private capital ﬂows, the
EMBI enters signiﬁcantly with a negative sign and the domestic interest
rate with a positive sign, except in the case of direct investment. Greater
yields in domestic bonds attract capital inﬂows, and ﬁnancial crises stimu-
late net outﬂows. The Federal Reserve funds rate enters signiﬁcantly only
in the equity and direct investment equations, but with a positive sign. One
possible explanation is that increases in the U.S. interest rate tend to gen-
erate economic slowdown, discouraging investment in that country and
thus stimulating investment abroad.
In contrast to the other private ﬂows, the coeﬃcient on the domestic in-
terest rate is negative in the direct investment equation. In this case, as an
increase in the domestic interest rate generates an economic slowdown, in-
ward direct investment is discouraged.35 The equation for oﬃcial agency
loans appears with a positive coeﬃcient on the EMBI, indicating the role
played by these loans in working as compensatory ﬂows during some
crises.36
8.5.6 The Relationship between Capital Flows and 
Macroeconomic Performance: A VAR Approach
We have estimated a structural VAR to further examine the role played
by capital ﬂows. Our interest is to assess the importance and impact of cap-
ital ﬂow movements on other macroeconomic variables as well as the fac-
tors behind those movements.
To estimate the VAR, we choose variables that are related to the behav-
ior of the current account and capital ﬂows: industrial production, current
account balance, private capital account, terms of trade (measured as the
ratio of export prices to import prices), EMBI  Brazil, real eﬀective ex-
change rate (measured as the value of foreign currency in terms of domes-
tic currency), and domestic real interest rate (Selic rate). The exogenous
variables are the Fed Funds interest rate and the U.S. industrial produc-
tion.
The sample goes from January 1995 through August 2004. Unfortu-
nately, although we are using monthly data, some of the results are sensi-
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used two-stage least squares, employing standard errors corrected by Newey-West het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. The instrumental variables
for the domestic interest rate and the EMBI Brazil were these variables lagged one and two
periods. We consider that the Federal Reserve funds rate is not aﬀected contemporaneously
by shocks to capital ﬂows to Brazil.
35. Since we could not reject the null of presence of a unit root in the direct investment, we
have also estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences, after having rejected the presence of cointegration.
None of the coeﬃcients is signiﬁcant.
36. We have also tested for the inclusion of other variables, such as output (level and
growth) and exchange rate (measured as deviation of a trend estimated using the Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter), but they did not enter signiﬁcantly.tive to the identiﬁcation structure assumed concerning the contemporane-
ous eﬀects of the shocks. Therefore, the results have to be viewed with cau-
tion. Appendix D provides a more detailed explanation of the variables
and identiﬁcation structure used.
For simplicity, we show only the resulting impulse response functions
and the variance error decomposition (ﬁgure 8.27 and table 8.13). In gen-
eral, the results using the point estimates of the impulse response functions
are consistent with the theory and historical evidence. The most interest-
ing result refers to the behavior of the variables when the economy is hit by
a shock to the EMBI. An increase in the country risk premium clearly leads
to a positive response of interest rate, exchange rate depreciation (depreci-
ation of domestic currency), and a reduction in capital ﬂows (measured by
the private capital account balance). Although with some lag, output falls.
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Fig. 8.27 Impulse-response functions: SVAR (January 1995–August 2004)As exchange rate depreciates, terms of trade deteriorate. These results are
in line with the historical evidence concerning the eﬀects of several crises
on the economy.
As expected, in response to positive interest rate shocks, output falls.
Positive shocks to the current account, in turn, lead to an exchange rate ap-
preciation, reduction in the EMBI, and some improvement in terms of
trade and output levels. Positive shocks to capital ﬂows are not persistent
but lead to a reduction in the interest rate, which seems to cause exchange
rate depreciation. In response to a favorable shock to terms of trade, ex-
change rate tends to appreciate. Finally, positive shocks to the exchange
rate are followed by an increase in the interest rate and EMBI. The increase
in the country risk premium, in turn, tends to cause a reduction in the cap-
ital ﬂows. Current account tends to respond somewhat positively. Output,
however, declines, but it reverts as the exchange rate, EMBI, and interest
rate return to their previous values.
The variance error decomposition allows us to have an idea of the im-
portance of certain shocks for forecast errors. Shocks to the current ac-
count, private capital account, and exchange rate explain a large part of
Capital Flows and Controls in Brazil 395
Fig. 8.27 (cont.)output forecast errors in a twelve- or twenty-four-month horizon. Interest
rate shocks aﬀect output forecast errors more strongly over a short hori-
zon. Private capital account forecast errors, in turn, are largely explained
by shocks to the EMBI, exchange rate, and interest rate. In the case of ex-
change rate, shocks to the country risk premium, private capital account,
and current account are responsible for a large part of its forecast errors.
Interest rate forecast errors, in turn, are explained by shocks to the private
capital account, terms of trade, EMBI, and exchange rate, besides shocks
to itself.
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Table 8.13 Variance error decomposition (%), SVAR (January 1995–August 2004)
Real 
Private Terms  eﬀective Real 
Standard Current  capital  of  EMBI  exchange  interest 
Variables error Output account account trade Brazil rate rate
Output
3 steps 1.6 54.0 0.3 1.1 1.8 1.5 26.0 15.3
12 steps 2.3 26.3 14.1 12.9 3.9 9.4 21.5 11.8
24 steps 2.7 19.5 19.0 20.1 5.6 9.7 16.4 9.9
Current account
3 steps 0.9 0.5 82.0 0.1 0.3 2.0 3.3 11.8
12 steps 1.2 4.7 57.8 4.1 3.1 8.4 8.6 13.5
24 steps 1.2 4.3 54.1 6.9 3.3 9.0 8.6 13.7
Private capital 
account
3 steps 4.1 5.1 1.5 37.6 0.8 23.1 23.7 8.2
12 steps 5.1 7.4 6.4 31.9 3.7 19.2 22.3 9.2
24 steps 5.3 7.2 6.7 31.2 3.9 18.6 22.1 10.2
Terms of trade
3 steps 1.6 0.5 0.4 4.0 80.6 4.6 8.6 1.3
12 steps 2.9 1.1 10.9 11.2 33.8 19.7 19.7 3.6
24 steps 3.7 0.9 23.5 19.7 22.6 17.4 12.7 3.1
EMBI Brazil
3 steps 1.8 0.9 1.3 22.5 2.4 44.3 27.2 1.5
12 steps 3.2 2.5 11.8 35.3 1.5 33.7 10.5 4.8
24 steps 3.4 2.7 15.6 34.1 1.6 30.8 9.9 5.4
Real eﬀective 
exchange rate
3 steps 5.5 8.1 0.1 12.2 11.2 3.0 61.2 4.2
12 steps 8.4 7.2 9.9 16.8 8.7 21.8 31.7 4.0
24 steps 8.9 6.8 14.3 16.5 9.0 19.8 29.1 4.4
Real interest rate
3 steps 3.4 1.1 0.6 11.5 0.1 5.1 18.5 63.2
12 steps 4.9 3.2 4.6 15.1 17.2 7.8 21.1 31.0
24 steps 5.6 3.2 7.2 13.2 15.5 12.2 22.3 26.3
Note:Standard errors are underestimated because their estimation assumes that coeﬃcients are known.8.6 Conclusions
Notwithstanding the ﬁnancial crises and macroeconomic volatility of
the recent past, ﬁnancial liberalization has led to reduced external vulner-
ability. Balance-of-payments patterns have changed. Recent growth has
been accompanied by a more favorable trade balance position. The proﬁle
of external ﬁnancing has improved after the ﬂoating of the currency. The
private sector has decreased signiﬁcantly its issuance of external debt, and
FDI has replaced portfolio investment as the main ﬁnancing source.
Liberalization of the capital account in the last ﬁfteen years has pro-
vided more convertibility to the currency. The new rules, however, coexist
with an old legislation that was established in a more control-prone envi-
ronment. Therefore, the result is a complex web of regulations and rules
that require consolidation and a mentality that still associates transfers
abroad with illicit or antipatriotic practices (based on the capital ﬂight leg-
islation period).
We believe further progress in capital account convertibility is war-
ranted. Liberalization should be accompanied by a broad range of reforms
to improve and foster stronger institutions—such as approval of de jure
central bank independence (not only de facto)—establish a longer track
record of responsible ﬁscal policy (under the ﬁscal responsibility law), and
reduce microeconomic ineﬃciencies and contractual uncertainties.
Appendix A
Main Exchange Restrictions in Brazil
Export Surrender
• Export proceeds are required to be converted into domestic currency
(“export surrender”). Furthermore, the netting of payments is not al-
lowed (e.g., exporters cannot use their proceeds to pay for an import
or an external debt before converting them into domestic currency).
Controls on Capital Flows
• There are generally no current taxes on capital ﬂows. Two exceptions.
Short-term ﬁxed income ﬂows (up to ninety days) are taxed at a 5 per-
cent rate. Payments of credit card transactions are taxed at 2 percent.
• All capital ﬂows must be registered at the Central Bank of Brazil.
Transfers of Currency
• Transfers abroad by residents are allowed but have to be registered at
the Central Bank.
Capital Flows and Controls in Brazil 397• Travelers may take out or bring into the country domestic or foreign
banknotes, checks, or traveler’s checks without restriction but must
declare to customs any amount over R$10,000 or its equivalent.
Limits on Transactions and Deposits in Foreign Currency
• Settlements of transactions among residents and pricing of contracts
or goods in foreign currency are prohibited.
• Lending in foreign currency is prohibited, except for on-lending of ex-
ternal foreign currency loans by banks.
• Deposits in foreign currency are generally not allowed. There are sev-
eral exceptions. For residents these are authorized foreign exchange
dealers, tourist agencies, Brazilian citizens living abroad, the Brazilian
Post Oﬃce Administration, credit card administration companies,
companies responsible for the development and execution of projects
in the energy sector, and insurance and reinsurance companies and
reinsurance brokers. For nonresidents, the exceptions are embassies,
foreign delegations, international organizations, foreign transporta-
tion companies, foreign citizens in transit in the country, and reinsur-
ance companies.
Direct Investment
• Foreign direct investment in Brazil is generally free. However, there
are legal restrictions on participation in certain economic activities.
• Brazilian direct investment abroad requires prior approval by the Cen-
tral Bank. The exception is transfers of up to the equivalent of US$5
million, including all remittances in the previous twelve months.
Nonresident Participation in Local Markets
• There is no restriction on the purchase of debt instruments. The pur-
chase by nonresident of shares is also generally free. There are restric-
tions in certain economic activities.
• Nonresidents may issue shares (or other securities that represent own-
ership) only through Brazilian depositary receipts (BDRs). The excep-
tion is for Mercosur countries, where direct sales are also allowed.
Resident Restrictions on Investment and Issues Abroad
• Residents may purchase bonds or other debt securities through dedi-
cated oﬀshore investment funds (FIEX).
• Residents may invest only in stock exchanges in Mercosur countries.
Brazilians are allowed to purchase depositary receipts issued abroad
by companies headquartered in Brazil.
• Corporations may issue depositary receipts abroad.
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Table B.1 Chronology of Main Changes to Capital Account Regulation (1990–2004)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
A. Resident and nonresident accounts: Regulations implemented prior to the 1990s
Decree 23, 501, 11/27/33,  Establishment of the domestic currency as 
replaced by  9/11/69 the only legal tender. In other words, pay-
Decree-Law 857 ments in foreign currency are not allowed 
(exceptions included contracts related to im-
ports and exports, exchange contracts, and 
debt involving nonresidents as creditor or 
debtor). Law 10,192 of 2/14/01 (previously 
Provisory Measure 1,053 of 6/30/95) reaf-
ﬁrmed those restrictions and also clariﬁed 
that restriction includes indexation to a for-
eign currency.
Decree 42,820 12/16/57 Determination that “it is permissible to take
out or bring in domestic and foreign paper
currency, as well as stocks and any other ﬁ-
nancial assets that have monetary value”
(article 17). The National Monetary Coun-
cil (CMN), if necessary, can restrict the en-
try and exit of domestic paper money (ar-
ticle 20).
Decree 55,762 2/17/65 Permission for nonresidents to transfer
abroad, without prior authorization, the
balance resulting from foreign exchange
sales or money orders in foreign currency
(article 57).
Circular Letter 5 2/27/69 Classiﬁcation of nonresidents’ deposit ac-
counts into two categories: (a) “free ac-
counts—coming from exchange sales,” 
and (b) “free accounts—from other ori-
gins.” The balance of the former that is not
withdrawn is freely convertible into foreign
currency; however, if the balance is with-
drawn and then subsequently returned to
the account, it is classiﬁed in the second cat-
egory.
(continued)
In panel A, we focus on the so-called CC5 accounts.Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 1,552 12/22/88 Creation of the “ﬂoating exchange rate 
market”—also called “dollar-tourism mar-
ket”—alongside the “commercial or free 
exchange rate market.” Permission for au-
thorized institutions to transfer their long
foreign currency position to nonresident in-
stitutions in exchange for domestic currency.
Furthermore, permission for the Central
Bank to change the conditions of the ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate market at any time.
Main changes
Circular Letter  2/20/92 L O Creation of a third category in the free ac-
2,259 counts established in Circular Letter 5, com-
plementing Resolution 1,552: “free ac-
counts—ﬁnancial institutions—ﬂoating ex-
change rate market,” which can be opened
by nonresident ﬁnancial institutions and
whose withdrawals and deposits are freely
available, including those coming from ex-
change sales or purchases.
Resolution  7/29/92,  R O Requirement that international transfers in 
1,946, Circular  10/7/92 domestic currency should be identiﬁed and 
2,242 registered in the central bank information
system (Sisbacen) when equal to or greater
than US$10,000.00.
Circular 2,677, 4/10/96,  E O Consolidation and revision of the regulation 
Circular 2,242 10/7/92 on nonresidents’ accounts and international 
transfers in reais. Requirement of Sisbacen
identiﬁcation when withdrawals or deposits
are equal to or greater than R$10,000.00
(revoked Circular Letter 5).
B. Foreign direct investment: Regulation implemented prior to the 1990s
Law 4,131, Law  9/3/62,  Regulation of foreign capital in Brazil, basi-
4,390, and  8/29/64,  cally direct investment and loans, and the 
Decree 55,762 2/17/65 associated remittance of income abroad.
Resolution 1,460 2/1/88 Regulation of the conversion of external
debt into investment in the country.
Constitution 10/5/88 Restriction on foreign investment in some
economic sectors.
Main changes
Resolution 1,810 3/27/91 L I Authorization of the conversion of external
debt instruments of the federal public sector,
bonds, and deposits denominated in foreign
currency for use in the National Privatiza-
tion Program.Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Law 8,383 12/30/91 L O Elimination of the additional tax, ranging
from 40% to 60%, on remittance of proﬁts
and dividends abroad that exceeded 12% of
registered capital, eﬀective 1/1/92. Reduc-
tion to 15% of the withholding tax on proﬁts
and dividends of nonresidents, eﬀective
1/1/93.
Resolution 1,894 1/9/92 L I Reduction from twelve to six years of the
period that investments resulting from the
conversion of external debt instruments for
use in the National Privatization Program
are required to remain in Brazil.
Circular 2,487 10/5/94 R I Prohibition of inﬂows in the form of both
advances for future capital increases and
bridge investments in anticipation of future
conversion of debts into investment.
Law 8,987 2/13/95 L I Opening of new possibilities for investment
in public utilities with the concession law.
Constitutional  8/15/95 L I Removal of the constitutional distinction 
Amendment 6 between Brazilian ﬁrms—licensed under
Brazilian laws and with headquarters and
administration in the country—and Brazil-
ian ﬁrms of national capital—restricted to
those under control of residents—and the
related special treatment given to the latter.
Regardless of owner nationality, ﬁrms li-
censed under Brazilian laws and with head-
quarters and administration in the country
were guaranteed (a) special treatment in the
case of small ﬁrms and (b) exclusivity rights
in the mining sector.
Constitutional  8/15/95 L I Removal of the constitutional requirement 
Amendment 7 that navigation along the coast and in the
inland waterways be conducted by national
vessels.
Statement of  8/23/95,  L I Possibility for an increase in the ownership 
Reasons 311,  9/9/97,  participation of nonresidents in ﬁnancial in-
Communications  3/19/03 stitutions, after case-by-case analysis by the 
5,796 and 10,844 monetary authority, and republic president’s 
ﬁnal decision.
Law 9,249 12/26/95 L O Removal of income tax, previously of 15%,
on remittance of proﬁts and dividends
abroad.
(continued)Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Directive MF 28 2/8/96 R I Imposition of a ﬁnancial transaction tax
(IOF) of 5% on privatization funds, when
the resources enter the country.
Directive MF 85 4/24/97 L I Reduction in IOF from 5% to 0% on privati-
zation funds.
Circular 2,997 8/15/00 E Introduction of electronic registration
(RDE) for foreign direct investment.
Resolution 2,815 1/24/01 L I Revocation of rule set in Resolution 2,099 of
8/17/94, which precluded the opening of
new bank branches controlled by nonresi-
dents.
C. Foreign portfolio investment and external loans: Regulation implemented prior to the 1990s
Law 4,131 and  9/3/62,  Regulation of foreign capital in Brazil, basi-
4,390, Decree  8/29/64,  cally direct investment and loans, and the 
55,762 2/17/65 associated remittance of income abroad.
Resolution 63 8/21/67 Regulation of external loans that are on-lent
by resident ﬁnancial institutions.
Resolution 64 8/23/67 Inclusion of BNDES among the institutions
authorized to on-lend loans under Resolu-
tion 63.
Resolution 125 12/12/69 Requirement that external loans be previ-
ously approved by the Central Bank.
Resolution 498 11/22/78 Determination of a minimum maturity of
ten years for external loans to be eligible for
reimbursement, reduction, or exemption
from income tax.
Resolution 644 10/22/80 Exemption from tax on the remittance
abroad of interest, commission, and is-
suance expenditures of commercial paper.
Resolution 1, 3/20/87 Regulation of the creation, operation, and 
289, with  management of foreign capital investment 
Annexes I to III companies, foreign capital investment
funds, and stock and bond portfolios.
Resolution 1,460 2/1/88 Regulation of the conversion of external
debt into investment in the country.
Main changes
Resolution 1,734 7/31/90 L I Authorization for certain ﬁnancial institu-
tions to issue commercial paper abroad.Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 1,803 3/27/91 L I Reduction in the minimum maturity of ex-
ternal loans from ten to ﬁve years for those
to be eligible for reimbursement, reduction,
or exemption from income tax (revoked
Resolution 498).
Debt agreement 4/1/91 E Preliminary agreement with nonresident
creditor banks for the elimination of arrears
outstanding at the end of 1990.
Resolution 1,832 5/31/91 L I Liberalization of the securities market to
foreign institutional investors, via Annex IV
to Resolution 1,289. These investments were
given exempted from income and capital
gains tax, but were subject to a 15% tax on
income remitted abroad.
Circular 1,969,  6/6/91,  L I Authorization for the issuance of convertible
replaced by  7/16/92 debentures abroad.
Circular 2,199
Resolution 1,853 7/31/91 L O Tax exemption for the remittance abroad of
interest, commission, and issuance expendi-
tures, applied to commercial paper and ex-
tended to ﬂoating-rate notes, ﬁxed-rate
notes, ﬂoating-rate certiﬁcates of deposit,
ﬁxed-rate certiﬁcates of deposit, publicly is-
sued bonds, and privately issued bonds.
Resolution 1, 8/1/91,  L I Authorization for the issuance abroad of de-
848, replaced by  5/18/92 pository receipts representing Brazilian se-
Resolution 1,927 curities (ADRs and International Deposi-
tary Receipts [IDRs])—Annex V.
Resolution 1,872 9/25/91 L I Permission for external borrowing for agri-
cultural ﬁnancing.
Circular 2,083 11/7/91 L I Reduction in the minimum term for on-
lending operations related to Resolution 
63 from one year (investment banks and
BNDES) or six months (commercial banks)
to ninety days.
Resolution 1,901 1/29/92 L Authorization for natural and juridical per-
sons to invest in securities in Mercosur
countries.
Communications  3/12/92,  R I Increase in the minimum average maturity 
2,747 and 2,757 3/13/92 of debt securities (commercial paper and
those listed in Resolution 1,853 of 7/31/91)
to thirty months to be eligible for tax ex-
emptions.
(continued)Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Circular Letter  4/24/92 R I Requirement that the minimum average ma-
2,269 turity for issuance of debt securities must be
thirty months, and increase, from thirty to
sixty months, in the minimum average ma-
turity required for those to be eligible for tax
exemptions (revoked Communications 2,747
and 2,757).
Resolution 1,921 4/30/92 L Authorization for hedge operations against
interest rate risk in the international market.
Resolution 1,935 6/30/92 L I Authorization for foreign investors repre-
sented by funds, investment companies, and
institutional investors to operate in the op-
tions and futures markets for securities, ex-
change, and interest rates.
Resolution 1,968 8/30/92 L Authorization for natural and juridical per-
sons to invest in derivatives markets as
hedge operations in Mercosur countries (re-
placed Resolution 1,901).
Circular Letter  10/29/92 R I Authorization for external loans only for 
2,333 those with a minimum average maturity of
thirty months.
Circular Letter  6/16/93 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity 
2,372 required for the issuance of debt securities
from thirty to thirty-six months, and in the
minimum average maturity from sixty to
ninety-six months for eligibility for reim-
bursement, reduction, or exemption from
income tax (revoked Circular Letter 2,269).
Circular Letter  6/16/93 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity 
2,373 required for loans from thirty to thirty-six
months (revoked Circular Letter 2,333).
Resolution 1,986 6/28/93 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity
of loans from sixty to ninety-six months for
those to be eligible for reimbursement, re-
duction, or exemption from income tax (re-
voked Resolution 1,803).
Resolution 2,012 7/30/93 L Expansion of the hedge operations that
ﬁrms are allowed to undertake, including,
besides those related to interest rates previ-
ously allowed, those related to exchange rate
and commodity prices (revoked Resolution
1,921).Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 2,013 8/19/93 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in ﬁxed-
income bonds.
Decree 995 11/25/93 R I Imposition of IOF of 5% on investments in
ﬁxed-income funds and 3% on external
loans when entering the country.
Resolution 2,028 11/25/93 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in debentures,
accompanied by the creation of foreign cap-
ital ﬁxed-income funds (FRF-CE) to invest
in private debt securities. Portfolio invest-
ment by foreign investors in ﬁxed-income in-
struments was restricted to those new funds.
Circular 2,384 11/26/93 L I In the absence of objection by the Central
Bank of Brazil, automatic authorization for
the issuance of debt securities by the private
sector after ﬁve working days of the request
for authorization.
Resolution 2,034 12/17/93 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in derivatives
markets—unless as a hedge—including op-
erations that result in ﬁxed income. FRF-
CE funds were allowed to invest in federal
bonds, derivatives, and ﬁnancial investment
funds (FAFs; revoked Resolution 2,028).
Resolution 2,042 1/13/94 L Authorization for certain institutions to
conduct swap operations involving gold, ex-
change rates, interest rates, and price in-
dexes in the over-the-counter market.
Resolution 2,046 1/19/94 R I Change in the regulation of investments un-
der Annexes I to IV, including prohibition
of investment in debentures (revoked Reso-
lution 2,013).
Circular 2,410 3/2/94 R I Termination of the automatic authorization
for the issuance of debt securities abroad
that had been set by Circular 2,384 of
11/26/93.
Circular Letter  3/14/94 R I Renewal or extension of contracts of debt 
2,444 securities subject to the same rules as new
contracts established by Circular Letter
2,372 of 6/16/93.
(continued)Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Debt Agreement 4/15/94 E Conclusion of the arrangements to resched-
ule Brazil’s external debts to commercial
bank creditors.
Resolution 2,079 6/15/94 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in certiﬁcates
of privatization and related securities.
Resolution 2,105 8/31/94 L O Permission for prepayment of external loans
and import ﬁnancing.
Resolution 2,115 10/19/94 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in FAFs.
Directive  10/19/94 R I Increase in the IOF from 5% to 9% on for-
MF 534 eign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, and
from 3% to 7% on external loans, and impo-
sition of a tax of 1% on foreign investment
in securities.
Circular 2,492 10/19/94 R I Increase in the minimum maturity for on-
lending operations under Resolution 63
from 90 to 540 days (revoked Circular
2,083).
Circular 2,545 3/9/95 L I Reduction in the minimum term for on-
lending operations related to Resolution 63
from 540 days to 90 days (revoked Circular
2,492).
Circular 2,546 3/9/95 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity
required for loans from thirty-six to twenty-
four months, with maintenance of the mini-
mum average maturity of ninety-six months
for those to be eligible for reimbursement,
reduction, or exemption from income tax
(revoked Circular Letters 2,372 and 2,373).
Circular 2,547,  3/9/95,  L I Reduction in the minimum average 
replaced by  4/20/95 maturity required for the renewal and exten-
Circular 2,559 sion of debt securities contracts from thirty-
six months to 180 days, with maintenance of
the minimum average maturity of ninety-six
months for eligibility for reimbursement, re-
duction, or exemption from income tax (re-
voked Circular Letter 2,444).
Directive MF 95 3/9/95 L I Reduction in the IOF from 9% to 5% on for-
eign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, from
1% to 0% on foreign investment in securi-
ties, and from 7% to 0% on external loans.Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 2,147 3/9/95 R O Revocation of the permission for prepay-
ment of external loans and import ﬁnancing
(revoked Resolution 2,105).
Resolution 2,148 3/16/95 L I Permission for external borrowing for the ﬁ-
nancing of agricultural investment. Mini-
mum maturity for these external loans of
180 days (revoked Resolution 1,872).
Resolution 2,170 6/30/95 L I Permission for ﬁnancial institutions to con-
tract resources abroad, with a minimum ma-
turity of 720 days, for the ﬁnancing of con-
struction or acquisition of new real estate
ventures.
Directive  8/10/95 R I Increase in the IOF from 5% to 7% on for-
MF 202 eign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, and
from 0% to 5% on external loans, and impo-
sition of a 7% rate on interbank foreign ex-
change operations between ﬁnancial institu-
tions abroad and institutions authorized to
operate in the foreign exchange market, and
on the formation of short-term cash hold-
ings (disponibilidades) of nonresidents.
Directive  9/15/95 L I Imposition of a diﬀerentiated IOF on exter-
MF 228 nal loans according to average maturity: 5%
for those with an average maturity of two
years, 4% for three years, 2% for four years,
1% for ﬁve years, and 0% for six years.
Resolution 2,188 10/8/95 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in futures and
options markets (revoked Resolution 2,115).
Circular 2,661 2/8/96 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity
required for external credits to thirty-six
months, with maintenance of the minimum
average maturity of ninety-six months for
debt securities to be eligible for reimburse-
ment, reduction, or exemption from income
tax (revoked Circulars 2,546 and 2,559).
Resolution 2,246 2/8/96 R I Prohibition of foreign capital, registered un-
der Annexes I to IV, to invest in agrarian
debt bonds (TDAs), national development
fund bonds (OFNDs), and Siderbras deben-
tures (revoked Resolution 2,188).
Resolution 2,247 2/8/96 L I Permission for nonresidents to invest in mu-
tual investment funds in emerging ﬁrms.
(continued)Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 2,248 2/8/96 L I Permission for nonresidents to invest in real
estate investment funds.
Resolution 2,266 3/29/96 L I Expansion of permission for external bor-
rowing to ﬁnance agricultural activities to
all ﬁnancial institutions, not only those par-
ticipating of the national system of rural
credit.
Resolution 2,271 4/18/96 R I Restriction of external ﬁnancing for states,
federal district, and municipalities, and their
dependencies, foundations, and ﬁrms, to the
reﬁnancing of their domestic debt.
Resolution 2,280 5/22/96 L I Establishment of some exceptions to the re-
strictions set in Resolution 2,271 (revoked
Resolution 2,271).
Directive  10/31/96 L I Reduction in the diﬀerentiated 
MF 241 IOF on external loans according to average
maturity: 3% for those with an average ma-
turity less than three years, 2% for four
years, 1% for ﬁve years, and 0% for equal to
or above ﬁve years.
Resolution 2,337  11/28/96,  E Introduction of electronic registration 
and Circular  11/28/96 (RDE) for inward and outward ﬂows, start-
2,728 ing with foreign portfolio investment.
Resolution 2,345 12/19/96 L I Authorization for the issuance abroad of de-
pository receipts representing nonvoting
shares of resident ﬁnancial institutions 
with shares traded in the stock market—
Annex V.
Law 9,430 12/27/96 E Revocation of the decrees that gave author-
ity to the National Monetary Council to set
some rules on nonresident income tax. As a
consequence, termination of tax rules set in
Resolution 1,853, and Circulars 2,546 and
2,661.
Provisory  12/31/96,  R I Exemption from income tax on interest, 
Measure 1,563,  8/13/97 commission, and issuance expenditures of 
turned into Law  debt securities with a minimum average ma-
9,481 turity of ninety-six months. Exemption from
income tax on interest of loans with a mini-
mum maturity of ﬁfteen years.Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Directive MF 85 4/24/97 L I Reduction in the IOF from 7% to 2% on for-
eign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, from
the diﬀerentiated rates to a ﬂat rate of 0% on
loans, and from 7% to 2% on interbank ex-
change operations between ﬁnancial institu-
tions abroad and institutions authorized to
operate in the exchange market, and on the
formation of short-term cash holdings of
nonresidents.
Resolution 2,384 5/22/97 L I Permission for foreign capital, registered
under Annexes I to IV, to invest in convert-
ible debentures and futures and options
markets as hedge operations.
Resolution 2,406 6/26/97 L I Authorization for creation of investment
funds in emerging ﬁrms—foreign capital.
Circular 2,783 11/13/97 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity
required for loans from thirty-six to twelve
months for new loans, and to six months for
renewed or extended loans.
Circular 2,807 2/26/98 R I Increase in the minimum average maturity
required for loans from twelve to twenty-
four months for new loans, and from six to
twelve months for renewed or extended
loans (revoked Circular 2,661 and replaced
Circular 2,783).
Circular 2,834, 8/24/98,  L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity 
replaced by  11/30/98 required for loans from twenty-four to 
Circular 2,850 twelve months for new loans, and from
twelve to six months for renewed or ex-
tended loans (revoked Circular 2,807).
Directive  12/30/98 R I Increase in the IOF from 2% to 2.38% on 
MF 348 foreign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, on
interbank exchange operations between ﬁ-
nancial institutions abroad and institutions
authorized to operate in the exchange mar-
ket, and on the formation of short-term
cash holdings of nonresidents, and from 0%
to 0.38% on foreign investment in securities.
Imposition of a 0.38% rate on ﬁnancial
transfers abroad and from abroad.
Circular 2,859 1/27/99 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity
required for loans from twelve to nine
months for new loans, and from nine to six
months for renewed or extended loans (re-
voked Circular 2,850).
(continued)Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 2,590 1/28/99 L I Reduction in the minimum average maturity
from 180 to 90 days for agricultural loans.
Resolution 2,591 1/28/99 L I Permission for foreign capital, registered
under Annexes I to IV, to invest in public
debt securities of the federal government.
Directives MF  3/12/99,  L I Reduction in the IOF from 2.38% to 0.5% 
56 and 157 6/24/99 on foreign investment in ﬁxed-income funds,
on interbank exchange operations between
ﬁnancial institutions abroad and institu-
tions authorized to operate in the exchange
market, and on the formation of short-term
cash holdings of nonresidents.
Resolution 2,625 7/29/99 L I Permission for ﬁnancial institutions to issue
bonds abroad and use the proceeds freely in
the domestic market as long as those re-
sources stay a minimum of ﬁve years in the
country.
Resolution 2,622 7/29/99 L I Permission for nonresidents to invest in fu-
tures contracts related to agricultural prod-
ucts.
Directive  8/18/99 L I Reduction in the IOF from 0.5 to 0% on for-
MF 306 eign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, on
interbank exchange operations between ﬁ-
nancial institutions abroad and institutions
authorized to operate in the exchange mar-
ket, and on the formation of short-term
cash holdings of nonresidents (revoked 
Directives MF 56 and 157).
Directive  8/18/99 L I Reduction in the IOF from 0.5 to 0% on for-
MF 306 eign investment in ﬁxed-income funds, on
interbank exchange operations between ﬁ-
nancial institutions abroad and institutions
authorized to operate in the exchange mar-
ket, and on the formation of short-term
cash holdings of nonresidents (revoked 
Directives MF 56 and 157).
Resolution 2,628 8/6/99 L I Permission for foreign capital, registered
under Annexes I to IV, to invest in ﬁxed-
income instruments, although within some
limits (replaced Resolutions 2,384 and
2,591).Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 2,683 12/29/99 L I Elimination of the requirement of ﬁve years
for the proceeds from the bonds issued
abroad by ﬁnancial institutions to stay in
the country. Elimination of minimum aver-
age maturity required for external loans (re-
voked Resolution 2,625).
Directive  12/29/99 R I Determination of the IOF on external loans 
MF 492 at a rate of 0% for those with average matu-
rity above ninety days, and 5% for those
with average maturity up to ninety days.
Provisory  12/30/99,  R O Termination of the income tax exemption 
Measure 2,013-4,  1/27/00 on interest, commission, and issuance ex-
turned into Law  penses for debt securities with a minimum 
9,959 average maturity of ninety-six months, and
of the income tax exemption for loans with
maturity greater than ﬁfteen years. Interest
payments on all external loans and debt secu-
rities, regardless of the maturity, taxed at 15%.
Resolution 2,689 1/26/00 L I Regulation of investment in the ﬁnancial
and capital markets, allowing nonresidents
to invest in the same instruments as resi-
dents. Inward investment must be registered
at the Central Bank.
Circular 2,975 3/29/00 E Update on conditions for the RDE of port-
folio investment (replaced Circular 2,728).
Resolution 2,770 8/30/00 L I Consolidation of the regulation on external
loans, including debt securities. Termination
of the requirement of prior approval by the
Central Bank for those operations, except
for those involving the public sector as a
debtor. Maintenance of the requirement of
registration at the Central Bank for those
operations (revoked sixty-seven resolutions,
ninety-six circulars, and ﬁfty-one circular
letters, including Resolutions 63, 64, 125,
and 1,986, and Circular 2,410).
Circular 3,027 2/22/01 E Introduction of RDE for external loans, in-
cluding debt securities.
Constitutional  6/12/02,  L I Exemption from the Provisional Contribu-
Amendment 37,  7/10/02 tion on Financial Transactions (CPMF) for 
and Decree  entries into foreign investor accounts involv-
4,296 ing inﬂows of ﬁnancial resources to the
country and remittances abroad when such
resources are used exclusively in stock oper-
ations.
(continued)Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 3,217 6/30/04 L O Permission for the prepayment of
external debt, including debt se-
curities.
Resolution 3,221 7/29/04 L I Establishment of conditions for
the issuance of real-denominated
external debt.
D. Brazilian capital abroad: Regulation implemented prior to the 1990s
Circular 1,280 1/18/88 Requirement that Brazilian in-
vestments abroad be compen-
sated by a sale to the Central
Bank of gold bought in the do-
mestic market for a value equiva-
lent to the investment. Previously,
authorization for Brazilian in-
vestment abroad was decided on
a case-by-case basis by the mone-
tary authority.
Resolution 1,534 11/30/88 As an alternative to the exchange
compensation with gold mecha-
nism, investment abroad by
Brazilian enterprises may be au-
thorized at the oﬃcial exchange
rate in an amount equal to for-
eign direct investment received by
the ﬁrm.
Main changes
Resolution 1,925 5/5/92 L O Termination of the mechanism 
of exchange compensation with
gold, transferring the operations
of investment abroad to the ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate market.
Circular 2,243 10/14/92 L O Authorization for nonﬁnancial
resident ﬁrms to invest abroad up
to US$1 million without prior au-
thorization, for each twelve
months by economic group.
When above this value, investors
must provide information to the
Central Bank thirty days ahead
of the exchange transaction.
Circular 2,472 8/31/94 L O Increase in the limit of the value
of Brazilian investments abroad
that do not require previous au-
thorization from US$1 to US$5
million.Table B.1 (continued)
Normative Nature  of  Direction 
measure Date measure of ﬂows Description
Resolution 2,111 9/22/94 L O Authorization of Foreign Invest-
ment Funds (FIEX) for invest-
ment in debt securities in interna-
tional markets.
Resolution 2,318 9/26/96 L O Regulation of residents’ invest-
ments in BDRs.
Resolution 2,356 2/27/97 L O Permission for residents to invest
in depository receipts issued
abroad representing resident
ﬁrms’ securities.
Circular 2,863 2/10/99 R O Increase in the minimum share of
Brazilian sovereign bonds in
FIEX funds from 60% to 80%.
Circular 2,877 3/17/99 R O Prohibition of ﬁnancial institu-
tions to invest directly or indi-
rectly in FIEX funds.
Resolution 2,716 4/12/00 L O Permission for private pension
funds to invest up to 10% of their
resources in BDRs.
Resolution 2,717 4/12/00 L O Permission for insurance compa-
nies, capitalization companies,
and open private pension funds
to invest up to 10% of their re-
sources in BDRs.
Resolution 2,763 8/9/00 E New regulation on residents’ in-
vestments in BDRs, which repre-
sent securities of nonresident
companies (replaced Resolution
2,318).
Decree-Law  10/21/69,  E Implementation of the ﬁrst sur-
1,060, Circular  6/8/01,  vey of Brazilian capital abroad, 
3,039 and  11/29/01 which has subsequently been con-
Resolution 2,911  ducted on an annual basis. The 
provision of information from
residents on their assets abroad is
mandatory.
Notes: L   liberalizing; R   restrictive; E   regulatory; I   inﬂows; O   outﬂows. We focus
on regulation of the capital account and convertibility of domestic currency into foreign cur-
rency. Thus, we do not deal, for example, with export and import payments. Resolutions are
rules set by the National Monetary Council; circulars, circular letters, and communications
by the Central Bank of Brazil; and directives by the Ministry of Finance. This chronology was
written directly consulting the rules, but initially using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and Soheit (2002).Appendix C
Classiﬁcation of Capital Flows
In the text, we classify the items of the capital and ﬁnancial account into
six groups: net direct investment, portfolio investment, loans and trade
credits, other short-term assets, oﬃcial agency–related loans, and other
items.37 We do not use the category “other investments” from the IMF’s
classiﬁcation because it consists of disparate ﬂows. In particular, it in-
cludes both compensatory ﬂows and private bank loans; thus, using the
balance of this category may be misleading. For example, in 2002, despite
negative net loan ﬂows and large currency transfers abroad, the “other in-
vestments” balance does not appear as signiﬁcantly negative (only –$0.2
billion in U.S. dollars) because of IMF loans (a net inﬂow of US$11.5 bil-
lion). Descriptions of our six categories follow.
1. Net direct investment. This category follows the IMF’s deﬁnition. It
covers inﬂows (outﬂows) related to acquisition, subscription, and increase
in the capital of resident (nonresident) enterprises, and similarly ﬂows re-
lated to partial or total sale of the capital. It also includes intercompany
loans.38 Unlike the investor in equities, the “direct investor seeks a signiﬁ-
cant voice in the management” of the enterprise (IMF 1993, p. 80). In gen-
eral, the criterion used is that the direct investor owns 10 percent or more
of the ordinary shares or voting power (for an incorporated enterprise) or
the equivalent (for an unincorporated enterprise; IMF 1993, p. 86).
2. Portfolio investment. This category follows the IMF’s deﬁnition as
well. It is represented by cross-border investment in equity securities that
is not classiﬁed as direct investment, and debt securities.39We also consider
these two items separately when relevant. This category includes securities
negotiated in Brazil and abroad.
3. Loans and trade credits. This category comprises loans not related to
oﬃcial agencies—which we call loans—and suppliers’ and buyers’ credits.
37. The balance-of-payments statistics are produced by the Central Bank of Brazil and are
available on its website (http://www.bcb.gov.br). The statistics follow the IMF’s recommen-
dations (IMF 1993; Central Bank of Brazil, 2001). Although those recommendations were
implemented in 2001, the historical statistics were conformed to the new methodology. We do
not use the statistics published in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the
IMF, because its high level of aggregation does not allow us to make the classiﬁcation used in
this paper.
38. It should include reinvested earnings as well, but because the data do not include this
item since 1999, we exclude it to maintain the coherence throughout the series. The statistics
do not include intercompany trade credits either.
39. Throughout the paper, we have excluded from the series of portfolio investment and
loans the values related to the conversion of debt under the Brady Plan, which appear in the
second quarter of 1994. Maintaining them in the series would distort the analysis.
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currency and deposits, which played an important role during the crises.
For example, in 1998, the negative balance of this category reached –$17.6
billion in U.S. dollars. It consists of three items of the balance-of-payments
statistics: “currency and deposits of nonresidents,” which includes ﬂows
through the CC5 accounts classiﬁed as “disposable funds”; “currency and
deposits of non-ﬁnancial residents,” which includes deposits available
abroad; and “other short-term assets” within other domestic investments,
which includes ﬂows through the CC5 accounts below 10,000 reais.
5. Oﬃcial agency–related loans. This category consists of loans to the
monetary authority (such as those from the IMF, BIS, Bank of Japan, and
U.S. Treasury) and long-term ﬁnancing from bilateral or multilateral or-
ganizations (such as IBD and World Bank Group).40 These loans have
clearly worked as compensatory ﬂows. For instance, in the crisis years of
1998 and 2002, the balance of this group was largely positive, US$10.9 bil-
lion and US$12.2 billion, respectively.
6. Other items. This category corresponds to the remaining items of the
capital and ﬁnancial account. It includes diverse items, but quantitatively
the most important ones are “currency and deposits of ﬁnancial residents”
and “other liabilities” within other foreign investments (mainly external li-
abilities assumed by the Central Bank, but whose repayments and interests
were not sent abroad duly).41The latter were the bulk of the group through
the mid-1990s because of the arrears that occurred in some periods.
We also classify ﬂows according to their maturity. Short-term debt ﬂows
correspond to equities and short-term debt securities, loans, and trade
credits. When including other short-term assets, we call them “short-term
ﬂows expanded.” Long-term debt ﬂows in turn comprise long-term debt
securities, loans, and trade credits, which, according to the balance-of-
payments classiﬁcation, correspond to contracts with maturity superior to
360 days. When including net direct investment, we call this group “long-
term ﬂows expanded.”
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40. Before 1979, some of the items that comprise oﬃcial agency–related loans are available
only on an annual basis. We distributed the annual values over the four quarters and added to
the data available quarterly.
41. The other items are “capital account” (according to IMF’s [1993] deﬁnition, which cov-
ers capital transfers and acquisition or disposal of nonproduced, nonﬁnancial assets), ﬁnan-
cial derivatives, and other long-term assets of residents (Brazil’s participation in multilateral
organizations, and greater-than-one-year escrow deposits). We do not classify “currency and
deposits of ﬁnancial residents” into the group “other short-term assets” because they are the
main counterpart of the payments registered in the balance of payments. For example, when
a resident repays a loan, it represents a reduction in external liabilities (increase in net assets
of residents), but as counterpart there is a reduction in the foreign assets of the bank that sold
the foreign currency (reduction in net assets of residents). In fact, the balance of this item was
positive in 1998 and 2002.Appendix D
Methodology Used in the VAR Estimation
To estimate the VAR, we have used the following endogenous variables:42
(a) log-level of industrial production in Brazil (seasonally adjusted); (b)
current account balance at constant prices (seasonally adjusted by the au-
thors; ratio to the average GDP in the period);43(c) private capital account
(ratio to the average GDP in the period); (d) log of terms of trade, mea-
sured as the ratio of export prices to import prices; (e) EMBI Brazil, sov-
ereign spread;44 (f) log of real eﬀective exchange rate (measured as the
value of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency);45 and (g) real in-
terest rate, measured as the Selic interest rate deﬂated by the IPCA.46 The
exogenous variables are the Federal Reserve funds rate and the U.S. indus-
trial production (seasonally adjusted).
The sample goes from January 1995 through August 2004. It starts when
the balance-of-payments statistics are available on a monthly basis accord-
ing to the IMF’s (1993) methodology. Furthermore, it does not include the
high-inﬂation period.47 We have estimated the VAR using the variables in
levels,48employing six lags for the endogenous variables.49For the exogenous
variables, we use their contemporaneous and one-period lagged values.50
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42. The data sources are the following: (a) IBGE; (b) and (c) Central Bank of Brazil; (d)
Funcex, available in Ipeadata; (e) JPMorgan; (f) and (g) Central Bank of Brazil. The estima-
tions were conducted using basically the Rats software.
43. We do not use the ratio to current GDP because the large movements in the exchange
ratio tend to distort the analysis: movements in the ratio can reﬂect changes in the exchange
ratio rather than capital account changes. On the other hand, the absence of normalization
generated problems for the convergence of the algorithm to estimate the structural parame-
ters. The same reasoning is valid for the private capital account.
44. Average of daily data of the EMBI Brazil from January 1992 through December 1996,
and the EMBI  Brazil thereafter.
45. Estimated by the Central Bank of Brazil using the IPCA as internal deﬂator and U.S.
CPI as external deﬂator. It corresponds to the average of the domestic currency value in rela-
tion to ﬁfteen countries weighted by the participation of these countries in Brazil’s exports.
46. We use the inﬂation accumulated in the last twelve months because of the diﬃculties in
using a measure for expected inﬂation for the whole sample. We use twelve months because
of the volatility of the inﬂation rate of one or even six months. From January 1995 through
July 1995, however, we use the average inﬂation in the period starting in September 1994 in-
stead of twelve months to avoid the distortions caused by the high-inﬂation period.
47. Thus, we do not face the problem of measuring the real interest rate in the high-inﬂation
period and making it comparable to the low-inﬂation period.
48. The estimation is consistent even in the presence of variables integrated of order one
(Sims, Stock, and Watson 1990; Hamilton 1994).
49. The Schwarz criterion has indicated two lags, but, using a Lagrange multiplier test, we
reject the null hypothesis of absence of serial correlation in the residuals. We then add lags un-
til accepting the null of no serial correlation.
50. Further lags were not signiﬁcant. The presence of one lag also avoids the problem of
spurious regression (Hamilton 1994).To determine the identiﬁcation structure concerning the contemporane-
ous eﬀects of the shocks, we have considered the relationships between
variables and possible lags in the eﬀects of one variable on another as well
as the correlation of the estimated reduced-form residuals. First, we have
assumed that current account, terms of trade, and interest rate are not
aﬀected contemporaneously by shocks to other variables. Eﬀective exports
and imports are usually the result of contracts set in advance.51 Terms of
trade, besides depending on exogenous variables, are aﬀected by pricing-
to-market decisions, which tend to react with some lag. Although interest
rate is a ﬁnancial variable, we are using the rate whose target is set by the
Central Bank. We are assuming that there is a one-month lag in the reaction
of the Central Bank either because information is not available promptlyor
because there is some lag in the Central Bank’s decisions. In particular, the
target for the basic interest rate is usually set on a monthly basis rather than
on a daily basis.52 Second, since the EMBI and exchange rate are ﬁnancial
variables, they tend to react more quickly. We assume then that reduced-
form shocks to the other variables aﬀect those variables contemporane-
ously. Third, for output and capital ﬂows, we have used the matrix of cor-
relation coeﬃcients of reduced-form residuals. We have considered only
residuals that have a correlation coeﬃcient greater than 0.1, which led to
assume that output responds contemporaneously to terms of trade, EMBI,
exchange rate,53 and interest rate, and capital ﬂows to EMBI, exchange
rate, and interest rate.
The resulting structure was the following (time subscripts were omitted):
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51. Even in the case of terms of trade, the correlation coeﬃcient between the reduced-form
shock to that variable and the shock to the current account balance was not positive (–0.02).
52. Even in the case of crises, the basic interest rate did not react in the same month.
53. The correlation with exchange rate is low, but the coeﬃcient was included to ease the
convergence of the algorithm.
      
 C A(L)  































0000001where OUT, CA, KA, TOT, EMBI, ER, INT, OUT_US, and INT_US
stand for output, current account, private capital account, terms of trade,
EMBI  Brazil, real eﬀective exchange rate, real interest rate, U.S. output,
and U.S. interest rate, respectively; C is a vector of constants; A and H are
coeﬃcient matrices; L is the lag operator; and e is the structural shock.
Since there are twenty-six free parameters, the model is overidentiﬁed.
Even though most of the structural coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant, we can
accept the identiﬁcation restrictions (p-value of 0.293).
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